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A bstract
This thesis examines the role of financial frictictions, capital regulation and fiscal 
policy in business cycle dynamics. It consists of three self-contained chapters.
In the first chapter I develop a model with financial frictions on the supply 
and demand side of credit. I introduce a financial accelerator mechanism on the 
demand side of credit that can be implemented without the costly state verifi­
cation approach. Moreover, using Bayesian methods I compare three models: a 
plain vanilla new Keynesian model, a model with banking frictions, and a model 
with banking and entrepreneurial frictions. I find that (i) there are substantial 
differences between the model with no financial frictions and the model with the 
banking sector in explaining non financial data, (ii) the model with the bank­
ing and entrepreneurial sector frictions outperforms the model with the banking 
sector friction in explaining financial data and (iii) the capital quality shock is a 
key driver of business cycle fluctuations.
The second chapter develops an open-economy DSGE model with an opti­
mizing banking sector to assess the role of capital flows, macro-financial linkages.
and macroprudential policies in the Philippines. The key result is that macro­
prudential measures can usefully complement monetary policy. Countercyclical 
macroprudential polices can help reduce macroeconomic volatility and enhance 
welfare. The results also demonstrate the importance of capital flows and fi­
nancial stability business cycle fluctuations as well as for supply side financial 
accelerator effects in the amplification and propagation of shocks.
The last chapter introduces in an otherwise standard real business cycle 
model a more general and data coherent class of production functions, namely a 
constant elasticity of substitution production function. I show that the degree of 
substitutability between production factors is a key ingredient to understand the 
(de)stabilising properties of a balanced-budget rule. Then I calibrate the model 
consistently with the empirical evidence, i.e. we set the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital below unity. I show that compared to the Cobb- 
Douglas case, the likelihood of indeterminacy under a balanced-budget rule is 
greatly reduced.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is composed of three chapters on dynamic macroeconomics. The first 
two chapters have a common theme and focus on the role of financial frictions in 
business cycle dynamics. In particular, the first chapter develops a framework 
with multiple financial frictions and asseses the empirical properties of financial 
factors for business cycle dynamics. The second chapter discusses the role of 
capital regulation and in particular of macroprudential policy in an open econ­
omy with a focus on the Philippines and, more broadly, on the Asia-Pacific area. 
Finally, the third and last chapter focuses on the role of the constant elasticity 
of substitution production function for aggregate stability.
In what follows I provide an introduction to every chapter. In each section I 
describe the background, the motivation and how the literature evolved with an 
explanation of the most relevant contributions.
13
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1.1 The Role of Financial Frictions in Business 
Cycle Dynam ics
The first chapter investigates the role of financial frictions in business cycle 
dynamics. The importance of financial factors came under the spotlight after the 
beginning of the financial crisis that started in 2007. The turmoil that followed 
had the most severe consequences on the real economy since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. As Brunnermeier (2009) highlights, the crisis originated in the US 
housing market and then affected the financial conditions of the banking system. 
This caused a large spillover effect in the US real economy and then in the rest 
of the world. By the end of 2008, most of the countries were in recession. For 
example, the United States entered in the recession on the third quarter of 2008 
and it lasted until the second quarter of 2009. In the the United Kingdom 
and in the Eurozone the crisis had even stronger repercussions. In both cases 
the economy experienced a double dip recession. In the United Kingdom the 
recessions lasted from the second quarter of 2008 until the third quarter of 2009 
and from the fourth quarter of 2011 until the second quarter of 2012. Similarly, 
in the Eurozone the recessions lasted from the second quarter of 2008 until the 
second quarter of 2009 and from the fourth quarter of 2011 until the first quarter 
of 2013.^
^The recession dates are measured by quarter on quarter changes of seasonal adjusted real 
GDP.
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The crisis highlighted two features of the financial markets. The first one is 
the amplification and persistence mechanism. The second one is the importance 
of financial shocks. The former refers to the ability of financial frictions to am­
plify the disturbances that occur in the real side of the economy. This channel 
operates through the creditworthiness of the borrowers. When economic condi­
tions change, they have a direct consequence of the ability of entrepreneurs to 
borrow since both the price of the collateral and the net worth is affected. As 
a consequence an amplification effect arises. The second feature highlights the 
importance of shocks that arises in the financial sector. This causes a reduction 
in the credit available to firm and it causes a worsening in economic conditions. 
The main difference with the first feature is that in this case shocks are gener­
ated on the supply side of the credit, meanwhile in the first feature shocks are 
generated on the demand side of the credit.
These features have had strong repercussions for the financial macroeco­
nomics literature and both features are now the at the core of economic theory. 
The first analysis of such mechanism traces back to Fisher (1933) who provide 
a theory of the Great Depression that focuses on the role of financial variables. 
However, the first analysis in general equilibrium is attributable to Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) who developed a framework where the level of borrowing from an 
agent depends on the level of net work. More formally, from the evolution of the 
literature that followed, it is possible to recognize two theoretical arguments in
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the way financial frictions are modeled:
• Incomplete Markets. This argument states there is a set of contracts that 
are not feasible and the subset of feasible contract are subject to an agency 
problem. This problem arises because agents cannot enforce the contract 
or because the contract is not incentive compatible and they can be fur­
ther divided into two categories: (i) Information Asymmetry (ii) Limited 
Enforcement. The difference between the two approaches resides in the 
information availability. In the first case the lender can not costlessly ob­
serve the borrower’s actions and can have full information only upon the 
payment of a cost. In the second case, the lender is fully capable of observe 
borrower’s actions, but her or she does not have the tools to enforce the 
borrower to fuMl the contractual obligations.
• Heterogeneity. This arguments states that agents are heterogenous in their 
preference or in technology. In general equilibrium, this important dimen­
sion allow agents to be lender and borrower.
The first argument gave birth to the "Net Worth" theory of financial fric­
tions. Both the information asymmetry and limited enforcement approach have 
in common that the net worth of the borrower plays a crucial role: the higher 
(lower) the net worth the lower (higher) is the cost of external financing. With 
this theoretical argument Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) developed the 
seminal framework that introduced the "financial accelerator". Such framework
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introduced the idea that adverse shock in the economy are amplified by dete­
riorating financial markets conditions. Similarly, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) 
developed a model with an endogenous agency costs although they do not apply 
it to the financial markets. All these approaches assume that banks are just a 
veil, therefore they put an emphasis on the amphfication and persistence mecha­
nism. More recently, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) 
developed a framework where the agency problem is on the bank side and they 
put an emphasis on the role of financial shocks. In their framework banks are 
subject to an incentive constraint that limits the amount of funds they can raise 
from depositors. Moreover they introduce the so called "capital quality shock" 
that introduces the prominent role of financial shocks in the hterature.
The second argument laid out the basis for the collateral constraint frame­
work. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) were the first to introduce such a constraint in 
general equilibrium and they explore the credit cycles implications. They show 
that credit frictions under the form of a constraint where the collateral repre­
sented by capital have a strong amplification and persistence effects of shocks, 
lacoviello (2005) applied the same framework to the housing market where the 
collateral is represented by the real estate and found that the predictions of the 
model match the US data for house prices. More recently, the heterogeneous 
agent framework has been used to Curdia and Woodford (2010) to study the 
financial sector and to analyse the impact of unconventional monetary policy.
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In the first chapter, I develop a model with financial frictions on the supply 
and demand side of credit. I introduce a financial accelerator mechanism on 
the demand side of credit that can be implemented without the costly state 
verification approach. Furthermore, with Bayesian estimation, I compare the 
empirical properties of this model with a model with a single financial friction 
and a model with no financial friction using financial and non financial data.
1.2 M acroprudential Policy: an Overview
The importance of bank capital regulation and the interactions with monetary 
policy are at the core of the second chapter. One important lesson that the 
crisis taught is that the traditional principles of banking and, more broadly, 
financial supervision were inadequate to identify systemic risk and to provide 
an adequate response that suck risk emerges. This became evident after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 when the failure of a single 
financial institution started a global financial crisis. The traditional view of 
financial regulation was that, in order for the system to be sound, only the 
single institutions had to be sound. In other words, this means that the focus was 
on the solvency of a single institution. Although this approach is an important 
cornerstone of regulation it is not sufficient since it fails to recognize and identify 
the contagion channels and more broadly the financial interdependencies and 
interlinkages between institutions. This is commonly referred as systemic risk.
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Formally, according with Kaufman and Scott (2003) this can be defined as "the 
risk or probability of breakdowns (losses) in an entire system as opposed to 
breakdowns in individual parts or components and is evidenced by co-movements 
(correlation) among most or all the parts".
In order to tackle such risk there has been an increasing demand for a new 
type of poficy that targets the system under a macro perspective since the gap 
between macroeconomic policy and the regulation of financial institutions was 
too wide To this extent, a macroprudential policy framework that targets the 
risk of the system as a whole started to develop.
As stated by the Bank of England (2009) the ultimate goal of macroprudential 
policy is to "increase the resilience of the system and to moderate exuberance 
in the supply of credit to the economy and especially to the financial system". 
This can be achieved by maintaining a stable provision of financial services to 
the economy and in particular to the credit supply and hedge against the risk.
As highlighted by Borio (2003) the differences between macroprudential pol­
icy and microprudential poficy, a poficy that targets single financial institutions, 
are substantial and relate to their objectives and to the nature of risk that they 
have to face. The ultimate objective of macroprudential poficy is to avoid costly 
GDP contractions and this can be achieved by limiting the financial system-wide 
distress. By constrast, microprudential poficy has the ultimate objective of de­
fending consumers or investors deposits through policies that limits the distress
1. Introduction 20
(or failure) of individual institutions. This is further confirmed by the nature of 
the risk that such policies face. The risk that macroprudential policy face arises 
within the financial institutions and therefore is endogenous. On the other hand, 
microprudential policy face an "exogenous risk" in the sense that the potential 
shock is triggered outside the financial system.
In order to achieve its objective, macroprudential policy has to contemplate 
a set of tools that affect (i) the balance sheet of financial institutions, (ii) the 
terms and conditions of financial transactions and (iii) the market structure. 
As highlighted by the Bank of England (2011), the most important instruments 
that target the balance sheet of the banks are maximum leverage ratios and 
countercyclical capital requirements. Furthermore, in this category belongs time- 
varying provisioning practices and distribution policies. The second sets of tools 
include all the policies that affect the terms and the conditions of credit and 
loans. Finally, among policies that change the market structure it is possible to 
include a tighter regulation on authorized counterparts that conduct financial 
trading.
These tools and in particular countercyclical capital regulation are at the 
core of the Basel III agreement on banking supervision and central banks across 
the world are studying how these policies can be implemented. For example, the 
United States has formed the Financial System Oversight Council that include 
the Reserve Bank. Similarly, in the European Union, the European Central
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Bank has created the European Systemic Board. In the United Kingdom, the 
Financial Policy Committee has been created by the Bank of England.
In recent year the macro-financial literature tried to understand the benefits 
of introducing macroprudential regulation. One important contribution is rep­
resented by Certler et al. (2012) who introduced capital regulation in the form 
of Pigouvian taxation on bank’s assets to show the importance of bank risk and 
risk-taking in business cycle dynamics. Christiano and Ikeda (2013) show, in a 
medium size New Keynesian model, that there are substantial welfare gains from 
imposing leverage restriction to the banking sector.
An interesting feature of capital regulation is raised by Christensen et al. 
(2011) and Kiley and Sim (2011). They show, in a New Keynesian set up that 
the desirability and the performance of a specific macroprudential policy depends 
on the type and on the nature of the shock that hits the economy.
In the second chapter I develop an open economy DSCE model with a bank­
ing sector modeled after Certler and Karadi (2011) and Certler and Kiyotaki
(2011) with macroprudential policy in the form of countercyclical capital regu­
lation. I find that macroprudential measures can usefully complement monetary 
policy. In particular, countercyclical macroprudential polices can help reduce 
macroeconomic volatility and enhance welfare.
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1.3 Aggregate Stability w ith  Balanced Budget 
Rules
The third and last chapter focuses on the role of the constant elasticity of sub­
stitution production function for aggregate stability. In particular, I examine 
its role in a standard neoclassic growth model where the government follows 
a balanced-budget rule. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) demonstrate that in 
such an environment balanced-budget rules can make expectations of higher tax 
rates self fulfilling if the fiscal authority relies on changes in labor income taxes 
to eliminate short run fiscal imbalances. Moreover they show that, when cah- 
brated values of labour and capital taxes for the US and other G-7 countries are 
considered, the model delivers indeterminacy.
In the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe model the determinacy area is crucially af­
fected by the labor demand schedule (LDS henceforth). As they demonstrate, 
in such model, the LDS slopes upwards. In this scenario, when agents expect 
higher tax rates in the future, for a given level of capital stock, hours worked 
and therefore the rental rate of capital will be lower. This is because the mar­
ginal product of capital is decreasing in the capital/labour ratio. In turn, since 
consumers want to invest less in the future, there is a decrease in current ag­
gregate employment and a decline in output. If we are on the increasing side of 
the Laffer curve, the government is obliged, following a BBR, to increase taxes 
today. Hence, expectations of higher taxes in the future lead to higher taxes to­
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day thus generating self-fulfilling prophecies. In the third chapter I demonstrate 
that, when a constant elasticity of substitution production function is nested 
into the model the LDS is strongly affected. In particular, when the elasticity of 
substitution parameter o is below the unity, the LDS slopes downwards. This 
slope change affects the determinacy area in a crucial way. A decreasing value 
of cr corresponds to an increase in the determinacy area. The intuition for this 
results is the following. As a decreases below unity, production factors become 
gross complements. This causes the demand of labour to be more tightly coupled 
to the stock of capital, which is predetermined. Consequently, hours worked can 
respond less freely to belief shocks. In other words, when o is ‘low’, the LDS 
is likely to slope downward, inducing current aggregate employment to increase 
when agents expect higher taxes. This implies that, when calibrated values of the 
tax rates for the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe are considered, 
the likelihood of being in a determinate area increases considerably.
Chapter 2
Financial Frictions and B usiness
Cycle D ynam ics
This chapter studies the empirical properties of financial frictions models for 
business cycle dynamics. As emphasized in the introduction, the financial crisis 
highlighted the importance of financial market conditions and their amplifying 
effects in business cycle fiuctnations. Alongside the role of financial interme­
diation, there is renewed interest into the driving forces of the economy with 
particular interest on the role of the investment shock. The motivation is that 
investment shock affects how new investment is formed and therefore how sav­
ings can be transformed in capital. The importance of this disturbance was first 
highlighted by Greenwood et al. (1988) and further emphasised by Greenwood 
et al (1997) and Fisher (2006). In two recent papers, Justiniano et al (2010
24
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and 2011) show that such a shock is one of the key drivers of the U.S. busi­
ness cycle fluctuations in the post-war period. More specifically, Justiniano et 
al (2011) estimate a DSGE model along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007) 
and Christiano et al (2005) with two investment shocks. The first one is an 
investment specific technology shock (1ST) that affects the way consumption is 
transformed into capital. The second one is the marginal efficiency of investment 
(MEI) shock that affects how investment is transformed into capital. They find 
that the 1ST shock has no role whilst the MEI shock has a prominent role in 
generating business cycle fluctuations.
The role of capital formation is at the core of this chapter. I construct and es­
timate a fully fledged model with features similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) 
and Christiano et al. (2005) together with a banking sector à la Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) and an entrepreneurial sector. 
Moreover, I include several real shocks and two shocks that aflFect the capital 
formation. The first is an investment shock that affects only the marginal in­
vestment and the second is a capital quality shock that affects the total amount 
of capital and, at the same time, the return on capital. This two shocks affect 
the capital accumulation identity in two different way. The first affects only the 
marginal investment while the second affects the whole equation. This allows the 
shock to enter in the return on capital equation, creating an asset price channel 
that the investment shock does not have.
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Moreover, 1 evaluate the empirical properties of several models to understand 
the importance of financial frictions and which are the sources of business cycle 
fluctuations. In particular 1 perform two types of exercises. In the first one 1 
compare the plain vanilla NK model with no financial frictions with the model 
with banking frictions without using financial data. This is similar to the works 
of Meier and Müller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve (2008) and 
Villa (2012). In the second exercise 1 add a financial time series (BAA corporate 
bonds yields) and 1 compare the banking friction model with the banking-firm 
frictions model. The aim of these exercise is to study the business cycle impli­
cations of having a model with an additional financial friction.
Our main findings are as follows. In the first exercise 1 find that there are sig­
nificant differences between the model without financial frictions and the model 
with the banking sector. Indeed, the marginal likelihood and the second mo­
ments analysis show that the model with banking frictions is preferred over the 
plain vanilla New Keynesian model in explaining non financial data. This is in 
line with the results obtained by Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve (2008) 
and Villa and Yang (2011) and Villa (2012) who find that adding a single finan­
cial frictions at the entrepreneurial level (Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve 
(2008) and Villa (2012)) or at the banking level (Villa and Yang (2011) and Villa
(2012)) significantly improve the fit of the model. In the second exercise 1 find 
that the model with banking and entrepreneurial firms outperforms the model
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with the banking frictions. The supremacy of the two frictions model on the 
single friction model is highlighted both in the marginal likelihood comparison 
and in the second moments analysis.
The variance decomposition highlighted a third important result of the esti­
mation. 1 find that the investment-specific shock plays a little role in business 
cycle fluctuations. This results depends crucially on the presence of another 
shock: the capital quality shock. This result is at odd with Greenwood (1988) 
Justiniano et al. (2010) and Justiniano et al. (2011) who find that a shock to 
the marginal efficiency of investment is the key driver. However Justiniano et al. 
(2011) acknowledge that the transformation of investment into capital depends 
on its relative price, which in turn is affected by the marginal efficiency of invest­
ment shock. The capital quality shock captures in a better way this intuition 
since an increase (decrease) of the return on capital decreases (increases) the 
asset price level. This influences the level of investment and therefore the level 
of capital.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the full model 
with financial frictions in the banking sector and at the entrepreneurial level. 
Section 3 introduces the Bayesian estimation, the calibration of parameters and 
the choice of priors. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation. Finally 
section 5 concludes the chapter.
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2.1 The M odel
The economy is populated by a representative household, a banking sector, four 
types of firms (entrepreneurs, good producers, capital producers and retailers) 
and a central bank.
The households-banks deposit relationship and the banks-firms lending re­
lationship are not frictionless. Indeed, both banks and firms are endogenously 
constrained in their balance sheet since the level of their assets they can acquire 
depends on the level of their respective net worth. I refer to this model as the 
"Banking-Firms" model to highlight where financial frictions affect the model. 
The remainig models are a straightforward derivation of this framework. ^
2.1.1 Financial Frictions 
Banks
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2 0 1 1 ) banks collect 
deposits from households and make loans to non financial firms. Given a certain 
deposit level a bank can lend frictionlessly to nonfinancial firms against their 
future profits. In this regard, firms offer to banks a perfect state contingent 
security. The activity of the bank can be summarized in two phases. In the first 
one banks raise deposits and equity from the households. In the second phase
 ^We refer to the "Banking" model as this model without the entrepreneurial friction and to 
the "New Keynesian model" as this model without the banking and entrepreneurial fricitions.
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banks use deposits to make loans to firms. The level of the loans Lt issued to
entrepreneurs depends on the level of the deposits Dt and the net worth NW^ 
of the intermediary. This implies a banking sector’s balance sheet of the form:
Lt = N W ^  + Dt (2.1)
Net worth of the bank accumulates according to:
ATWf =  (2.2)
=  ( R ^ - R t ) L t - i  + RtNW ,t^  (2.3)
The above equation states that it’s profitable for the bankers to accumulate assets 
until they remain in activity. Therefore the banker’s objective is to maximize 
expected discounted terminal wealth:
OO
V f  = E t Y , ( l -  (2.4)
i=0
where At^ t+i is the stochastic discount factor^, subject to an incentive constraint 
for lenders (households) to be willing to supply funds to the banker and 6 is the 
survival rate, the probability of remaining in business the next period. Therefore 
the term (1  — 0 )0 * represents the probability for a bank to exit at the zth period.
2 See section 2.1.2, for the definition of the stochastic discount factor.
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To motivate an endogenous constraint on the bank’s ability to obtain funds, 
the following agency problem is introduced. 1 assume that after a bank collects 
their deposits, the bank’s manager may transfer a fraction 0  of assets to her 
family. In  the case that a bank diverts assets for its personal gain, it defaults 
on its debt and shuts down. The creditors may re-claim only a limited fraction 
1 — 0  of funds. Because its creditors recognize the bank’s incentive to divert 
funds, they will restrict the amount they lend. In this way a borrowing constraint 
may arise. Therefore, in order to ensure that bankers do not divert funds, the 
following incentive constraint must hold:
v f  > e^Lt (2.5)
The incentive constraint states that for households to be willing to supply funds 
to a bank, the bank’s franchise value Vt must be at least as large as its gain from 
diverting funds.
To solve the problem I guess a linear solution of the form:
v ^ t  = Dt) =  p,,tLt -  Vi,tDt (2.6)
where are time-varying shares that represent the marginal values of the
loans and deposits at the end of period t. If I define as the leverage ratio 
of a bank that satisfy the incentive constraint, from the optimization problem I
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have:.3
Lt = <j>tNWt^  (2.7)
where (p^  is equal to:
and:
^d,t — EtDFt,t+i^t+iRt+i (2-9)
l^id,t — R tD R t,t+ i^ t+ i{R i,t+ i — R t+ i)  (2.10)
where Q f is the shadow value of a unit of net worth and is equal to:
Q f =  1 — cr  ^ +  C T B [V d ,t +  (Pt f^ ld , t )  =  1 — (2.11)
where represents the fraction of bankers that survive to the next period and
the second equality has been definied by substituing eq. (2 .8 ) in the first equality.
Evolution of A ggregate B ank N et W orth . At an aggregate level bank net 
worth of bankers is the sum of the net worth of existing bankers and the
net worth of new bankers
NWf = NW t^ + l^K t  (2.12)
^See Appendix Al.
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Net worth of existing bankers equals earnings on loans made in the previous 
period minus the cost of deposits, the financing source, multiplied by a fraction 
0 , the probability that they survive until the current period:
NW ^t = <7® -  RtD t-i) (2.13)
Since new bankers cannot operate without any net worth, I assume that they 
receive a transfer from the household equal to a fraction /( I  ~  a) of the total 
value assets of exiting bankers. This implies a net worth of the new bankers 
equal to:
= f R i L t - i  (2.14)
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage a firm that borrows from the banking sector to finance 
its production of wholesale goods. As in Bernanke et al. (1999) entrepreneurs’ 
net worth plays a crucial role in the amount of loans that they can demand. 
The crucial difference is how this feature is implemented. To motivate a role 
for the financial structure, the "financial accelerator" literature uses the costly 
state verification problem introduced by Townsend (1979) where lenders pay 
an auditing cost to observe the realized return of the borrows. This cost is 
interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy. This mechanism works as follows. In
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each period entrepreneurs can, costlessly, observe their output meanwhile banks 
have to pay and auditing cost if they want to observe the output. If the realized 
output is not enough to pay the loan the entrepreneur defaults and the financial 
intermediaries audit the loan and recover the remaining part of the loan, less the 
monitoring costs. Bernanke et al. (1999) uses this framework to show that the 
contract implies an external finance premium that depends in the entrepreneur’s 
leverage ratio.
In this framework this assumption is no longer essential. The financial accel­
erator on the demand side of credit can be expressed with a framework similar 
to the one described in the banks’ section. This problem can be formulated in 
the following way.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011) 1 assume that at the end of each period 
entrepreneurs purchase capital that will be used in the next period at the 
price Qt. This capital acquisition is financed with their net worth N W f  and with 
loans Lt supplied by the banking sector. The balance sheet of the entrepreneur 
is therefore given by:
QtK, = N W f  + Lt (2.15)
The entrepreneur demand of capital depends on the expected marginal return 
and the marginal external financing cost The optimal capital demand
ensures that:
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% , =  +  (2.16)
Wt-1
where (1 .— 6)Qt is the value of one unit of capital and Zt is the marginal produc­
tivity of capital. The term CQt represents the capital quality shock that follows 
an autoregressive process:
log ^  =  POQ log +  iC Q t (2.17)
where 0  < Pqq < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and ecQt represents an i.i.d. 
shock with zero mean and standard deviation ctcq. Net Worth evolves according 
to:
N W ^  =  R k ^ t K t - i  — R i ^ t L t - i  (2.18)
=  {R k,t-R i,t)K t-i + R ,,tN W t^  (2.19)
The previous equation states that entrepreneurs are willing to expand their bal­
ance sheet as long as the spread Rk,t ~ Ri,t is positive. The entrepreneurs want, 
thus, to maximize their discounted terminal wealth:
OO
V f  =  Et ^ ( 1  -  a^)a '’’^ Kt,wNWtlt+i (2.20)
Where $ f  is the probability that an entrepreneur survives the next period. The
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term (1  — a ^ )a f  represents the probability that an entrepreneur dies at the at 
end of period i.
As before 1 assume the following agency problem. At the end of period the 
entrepreneurs may divert a fraction 0^ of the assets for his/her personal gain. 
When this happens the bank can reclaim only a fraction 1— 6^ of the loan. 
Given this incentive of diverting funds the bank restrict the amount of the loans 
to the present value of the entrepreneurs. This can be formally expressed as:
V f  > e^QtKt (2.21)
This incentive constraint states that if the entrepreneurs wants to have access to 
the funding opportunities offered by the banks he or she has to have a sufficient 
amount of net worth.
This problem can be solved with a linear solution of the form:
Lt) =  (2.22)
where are time-varying shares that represent the marginal values of the
capital and loans at the end of period t.
2. Financial Frictions and Business Cycle Dynam ics 36
In this case, the incentive constraint can be expressed as:'^
NWf<pf = QtKt (2.23)
where:
E
represents the leverage ratio. The solution to the value function of this problem 
yields:
^i,t — At,t+iLlt+iRi,t+i (2.25)
Lki,t =  {Rk,t+i — Ri,t+i) (2.26)
where:
Oi+i — 1 — (7  ^+ — 1 — cr  ^+ a^9^<pf (2.27)
where cr  ^ represents the probability that an entrepeneur survives to the next 
period the second equality has been definied by substituing eq. (2.24) in the 
first equality.
Evolution of A ggregate E n trepreneur N et W orth  As in the banker’s 
case the aggregate level of entrepreneurs is given by the sum of the net worth of
‘See Appendix A2 for the solution to the optimization problem.
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existing entrepreneurs tka net worth of the new entrepreneurs
N W f = N W ft +  N W f  (2.28)
Net worth of existing entrepreneurs equals earnings on assets held in the previous 
period minus the financing cost, the loans contracted in the previous period, 
multiplied by the probability that they survive until the current period 6^:
N W f  = O’" -  R ith - i]  (2.29)
The net worth of the new entrepreneurs is equal to:
N W f  =  i ’^ Rk,tKt-i (2.30)
As before 1 assume that they receive a transfer from the household equal to a 
fraction /  (1  — a^) of the total value assets of exiting entrepreneurs.
2.1.2 The R eal Econom y  
Households
There is a continuum of households who consume, work and deposit savings 
in a bank. Within the households, there are three groups: a fraction of 
banker, a fraction w ^oi entrepreneurs and a fraction 1 — of workers.
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Bankers manage a financial intermediary and transfer non negative dividends to 
the households. Workers supply labour and return their wages to the households. 
Entrepreneurs, manage firms that produce wholesale goods.
Bankers remain engaged in their business activity of the next period with a 
probability 9^. This finite survival scheme is needed to avoid that bankers accu­
mulate enough wealth to remove the funding constraint. Upon exiting, a banker 
transfers retained earnings to the households and becomes a worker. Therefore 
in each period ( 1  — 9^)w ^  workers become bankers, keeping the number in each 
group constant.. As bankers, entrepreneurs have a probability 9^ of remaining in 
their business activity and in each period (1  — 9^)w ^  workers becomes entrepre­
neurs. Each new banker and entrepreneur receive a transfer from the household 
since they can not start any banking or entrepreneurial activity without funds.
The representative household derives utility from consumption Ct and leisure 
LE,f Its preferences are specified by the following utility function;
t=0
The term eBt represents a preference shock that follows an autoregressive process:
log — PeB log (2.32)
where 0  < < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and Cgg represents an i.i.d.
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shock with zero mean and standard deviation (jgg.The household budget con­
straint is given by
Ct +  Dt-\-i — ^ tL t  +  RtDt +  4- (2.33)
The representative household chooses to maximize it expected utility function 
in eq. (2.31) subject to the budget constraint in eq. (2.33). The first order 
conditions for labour supply is:
xg  -  - S
where kL,t is the marginal utility of labour and Ac,t is the marginal utility of 
consumption. The first order condition for consumption is:
I = Et {Rt+iDFt^t+i) (2.35)
where DFt^t+i is the stochastic discount factor defined as:
c,t
Labour Packer
As with final goods firms, the labour packer minimizes the cost Wt(j )Nt( j )dj
of producing the composite labour service N t  = ( /^q F t This
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leads to the standard result for the Dixit-Stigliz aggregator:
W ,=
1 —
(2.38)
•1
/ W^(j)A,(j)d;' (2.39)
J o
where Wt is an aggregate wage index.
Trade Unions
Wage setting by the trade-union again follows the standard Calvo framework 
supplemented with indexation. At each period there is a probability 1 — that 
the wage is set optimally. The optimal wage derives from maximizing discounted 
profits. For those trade-unions unable to reset, wages are indexed to last period’s 
aggregate inflation, with wage indexation parameter 7 ^.The trade union that buy 
homogeneous labour at a price Wh,t and converts it into a differentiated labour 
service of type j .  The trade union time t then chooses W^(j) to maximize:
(2.40)
where Nt{j)  is given by (2.37) so that Nt+k{j) =  ^Ft+k and
77 is the elasticity of substitution across labour varieties. This leads to the first
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order condition:
=  0 (2.41)
where MSw,t =  is the time varying wage mark-up with eWt being the
wage mark-up shock. Then by the law of large numbers the evolution of the 
wage index is given by:
Wage dynamics are given by defining:
P t  H w , t
(2.44)
M5„,t =  - ~ e W t  (2.45)fl — L
where eW  ^is a wage mark-up shock. The term eWt represents an wage mark-up 
shock that follows an autoregressive process:
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where 0 < < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and Cew represents an i.i.d.
shock with zero mean and standard deviation dew
Using the Lemma in Appendix C, 1 can express the aggregate wage dynamics 
in the following way:
Hw,t — TT/i f np,t+i \JJ7- J
M-1
Rw,t+i = NtAc,t (2.47)
Jw,t —
n p,t+i
n w ,t
n p,t
+  (1 ~  ^w)
Jw,t \  1 A*
Hw,t j
Y
=  1
G ood Producers
(2.49)
Good producers produce output Yt using capital and labour following a constant- 
returns-to scale-technology:
Yt = A tK p ‘^ N‘ (2.50)
where At is a technology shock, that follows an autoregressive process:
1 -At , At-i
l o g ^  =  P yllog— + 6.4 , (2.51)
where 0 < < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and represents an i.i.d.
shock with zero mean and standard deviation (Ta ^
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The first order condition for this problem are standard:
pWyW
Zt = { l - (2.52)
Wt = oi Yt
Ht (2.53)
Capital Producers
Capital producing firms at time t convert R of output into (1 — f{Xt))It  of new 
capital sold at a real price Qt. They then maximize expected discounted profits
OO
Ft DFt t^+k [Qt+kFIt(l — f  {h+k/It+k-l))It+k — L+k] (2.54)
A;=0
where DFt t^+k = real stochastic discount rate. This results in
the first-order condition
Q,Z7,(1 -  /(A t) -  (%t)) +  F, 1 (2.55)
Up to a first order approximation this is the same as
QtZk(l -  f(Xt) -  Xtf(Xt))  + Et
(1 +  Rt+i) . =  1 (2.56)
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Capital evolves according to:
Kt+i =  CQt [(1 -  (2.57)
Where R is investment, 5 is the depreciation rate. The term ZR  represents an 
investment specific shock (MEI shock) that follows an autoregressive process:
Z  T 7 1
log = Pi  log —^  - +  ^zit (2.58)
where 0  < pj < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and ezit represents an i.i.d. 
shock with zero mean and standard deviation aj.
This set up is completed with the following functional form:
f ( X)  = M X t f  (2.59)
where Xt  =  7^ .h-i
The R etail Sector
The retail sector uses a homogeneous wholesale good to produce a basket of 
differentiated goods for consumption
\  ( / ( ( - I )/ /*! VK-lj
Cf =  ( y  (2.60)
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where (  is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations 
for each intermediate good m  with price Pt{'nn) of the form
where Pt = Ft(m)^~‘’dm  ^ ^. Pt is the aggregate price index.
Now 1 assume that there is a probability of 1 — ^  at each period that the price 
of each retail good m  is set optimally to P^(m). If the price is not re-optimized, 
then it is held fixed.^ For each retail producer m the objective is at time t  to 
choose {P°(m)} to maximize discounted profits
OO
E tJ 2 ^ '‘DFt,t+kYt+k{m) [P“(m) -  (2.62)
k=0
subject to (2.61), where DFt t^+k is the nominal stochastic discount factor over 
the interval [t, t -f A:]. The solution to this is
EtŸ^eDFtf+kYt+k(m)
k=0
Pfrn) -  _  MStPt+kMCt+, = 0 (2.63)
where MSp^t = T^PPt. The term FPt represents an price mark up shock that
^Thus we can interpret as the average duration for which prices are left 
unchanged.
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follows an autoregressive process:
log EPt -  log E P  = Pgp (log EPt-i -  log EP) +  6EP,t (2.64)
where 0 < pgp < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and €EPt represents an i.i.d. 
shock with zero mean and standard deviation a pp.
By the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
A+7 =  +  (1 -  (2.65)
Using the Lemma in Appendix C and defining here the nominal discount factor
by DFt,t+k =  ^ ^^Ac’l^ /Pt^ ’", inflation dynamics are given by
=  YtAc,t (2.66)
(2.67)
1 =  $ n ^ ' +  ( l - ( )  ( A )  (2.68)
Real marginal costs are given by
p W
MCt = (2.69)
Pt
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Resource Constraint and th e Central Bank
Output is divided between consumption, investment and government consump­
tion. The resource constraint is therefore given by:
Yt — Ct It P Gt (2.70)
The term Gt represents a government spending shock that follows an autoregres­
sive process:
log Gt — log G = Pc (log Gt-i — log G) -j- 6G,t (2.71)
where 0 < pg < 1 is an autoregressive parameter and eG,t represents an i.i.d. 
shock with zero mean and standard deviation ao-
The nominal and expected ex post real interest rates are related by the Fisher 
equation
Rt = (2.72)
lit
where the nominal interest rate is a policy variable, given by a Taylor-type rule 
of the form:
( ^ )  (z) + (y)) +
(2.73)
where p, 0y are the Taylor rule coefficients and €M,t is a i.i.d. shock with 
zero mean and standard deviation <tm-
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2.2 Estim ation
2.2.1 D ata  and E stim ation  Strategy
The Bayesian approach employed here makes use of the likelihood function com­
bined with the prior assumptions about model parameters, which then allows 
us to evaluate their posterior probability. First, the approximation of poste­
rior mode is estimated, followed by a posterior simulation applying Metropolis- 
Hasting Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MH-MCMC) methods, as discussed in 
Schorfheide (2000). Based on the posterior draws of the model parameters, 
point estimates of parameter vector can be obtained from the generated values 
by using various location measures, such as the mean or median. Similarly, mea­
sures of uncertainty follow from computing the percentiles of the draws. One 
of the main advantages of adopting a Bayesian approach is that it facilitates 
a formal comparison of different models through their posterior marginal likeli­
hoods. These allow us to compute Bayes factors and the corresponding model 
probabilities.
I estimate and compare the model with firms and banking frictions, the model 
with banking frictions and the plain vanilla NK model using the software Dynare 
4.3.2. Each variant has an associated set of unknown parameters 0 G 0 , of which 
I want to characterize the posterior distribution. The marginal data density 
of each model is computed using the Geweke (1999) modified harmonic-mean 
estimator. All models contain eight orthogonal structural shocks such that
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— pct-i +  l't (2.74)
with Et =  {e^, eg!, ew-, ^b , e/, ep, e^, cpp}.
I carry out two distinct comparisons, which will make use of different observ­
ables. In a first stage, I examine whether or not the introduction of a banking 
sector yields any significant gains it terms of empirical fit when compared to 
a benchmark NK model using non financial data. Given that the latter model 
does not generate a spread, I use standard macroeconomic variables as in Smets 
and Wouters (2007), namely output, private consumption, fixed private invest­
ment, wages, hours worked (per worker), the inflation rate and the interest rate. 
Real output is constructed by taking the first difference of the log of nominal 
output divided by population and the GDP deflator, a procedure also used for 
consumption, investment and wages. Inflation rate is measured as the quarterly 
log-difference of the GDP deflator, while the Federal Funds rate is used as the 
nominal interest rate.
In a second experiment, I compare the model in which financial frictions aris­
ing solely from the banking sector with the model with both demand and supply- 
side financial frictions using data that includes a financial variable. Given that 
both models embed a spread, I can then add the BAA Corporate Bond Yields 
to the list of observable variables, as a proxy for Rk. All series come from the 
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For comparability with
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literature, I use demeaned quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2008Q3, thus focusing 
only on normal times, i.e, what is now referred to as the "Great Moderation" 
period.
All the models have been estimated with 2 blocks of 250.000 draws. As figures
3, 4, 5 and 6 show, convergence has been achieved for all the models.
The corresponding measurement equations for the observables are, using 
lower case letters to express variables in log-deviations from the steady state:
dy =  log(î/t) -  log(2/t_i) (2.75)
dc = log(ct) -  log(ct_i) (2.76)
di = log(ii) -  log(it_i) (2.77)
dw = log(wt)-log(W(_i) (2.78)
Kbs = log (nt) (2.79)
n„6s =  l0g(7Tt) (2.80)
Robs =  log(r;i() (2.81)
Rk,d,s = Iog(r*t) (2.82)
Figure 1 shows the observables used in the estimation exercises. Moreover, 
figure 2 shows the relationship between the BAA corporate bond yields and 
interest rate spread against HP filtered output. The figure clearly shows the 
negative relation between these two macro variables.
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Consumption Hours Worked
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Interest Rate
Figure 1 - Observables used in the estimation exercises.
Figure 2 - BAA Corporate Bond Yields (blue line) and HP filtered output
(green line).
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2.2.2 Calibrated Param eters
I fix a set of parameters to values commonly used in the literature and those are 
calibrated to the US economy. For the real part of the economy the calibration 
is standard. One model period corresponds to a quarter so the discount factor 
is set at 0.99.. The share of capital in the production function is set at 0.3. The 
models are calibrated to hit certain real and financial ratios. For the real part 
the economy is set to achieve a government spending to output ratio of 0.2 and 
an investment to output ratio of 0.2. This last feature impfies that 5 varies across 
the models. In the plain vanilla New Keynesian model it has a value of 0.0202, 
in the banking model of 0.0252 and in the Banking-Firms model of 0.0332. The 
parameter q is cahbrated to target hours worked in the steady state 0.4.
The banking sector is calibrated following Gertler and Karadi (2011). cr  ^ is 
set at 0.975 implying an survival rate of 10 years. and 6^ are calibrated to 
hit an average credit spread of 100 basis points and an financial intermediaries 
leverage ratio of 4. Entrepreneurs have a survival rate of 10 years therefore 
is set at 0.975. The remaining to parameters are calibrated following Bernanke 
et al (1999). Therefore and 6^ are calibrated to have a leverage ratio of 
the entrepreneurs equal to 2 and a spread of 200 basis points. The full list of 
parameters can be found in Table 9 in Appendix D.
In order to implement Bayesian estimation, prior distributions for the pa­
rameters must be defined, as shown in Tables 5 to 8. I follow the standard
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practice of defining beta densities for parameters bounded between 0 and 1, 
inverse gamma distributions for standard deviations of shocks and normal den­
sities for unbounded parameters, with prior means similar to the ones used in 
Smets and Wouters (2007). In particular, the beta distribution is used for the 
parameters bounded between zero and one, the normal distribution is employed 
for the unbounded parameters and the inverse gamma distribution is used for 
the standard deviation of the shocks.
2.3 Quantifying the Im portance o f Financial Fric­
tions
In this section I discuss the estimation exercises and I assess the importance 
of financial friction mechanism for business cycle dynamics. To this purpose I 
analyse the differences in the parameters estimates, in the marginal likelihood 
and in the second moments.
2.3.1 W ithout Financial D ata
Tables 10 and 11 contain the posterior means for the parameters of each model 
together with 95% confidence intervals. Most estimated parameters are similar 
across these two models and are largely consistent with results found elsewhere 
in the literature. For example, nominal frictions in the form of price and wage
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stickiness imply that firms adjust prices nearly every 4 quarters, with a high 
degree of indexation, while the average duration of wage contracts and indexation 
levels are somewhat lower, but still reasonable. Equally, habit persistence and 
the interest rate rule parameters (the degree of interest rate smoothing and the 
feedback from inflation), as well the persistence of shocks, are roughly similar in 
these two models and in line with previous results for the US economy.
However, there are some interesting differences between the two specifica­
tions. Indeed, the investment adjustment costs parameter ^ ^ i s  larger in the 
banking frictions model than in the NK model, though it is not surprising to 
find an interaction between investment costs and financial frictions. Moreover, 
shocks in the banking frictions model tend to be less volatile, in particular the 
wage markup shock and, more importantly, the return on capital shock, which 
suggests that the banking frictions model does a better job at explaining the 
sources of fluctuations arising from financial shocks.
As explained above, my analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I assess to what 
extent financial frictions arising from the banking sector improves fit relative to 
the perfect capital markets NK model. The marginal likelihood comparison, in 
Table 1 shows that the model with the banking frictions has a higher marginal 
likelihood and the difference between the two log marginal likelihoods is 6.5.®
'This result is in line with Christensen and Dib (2008).
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Table 1 First Exercise
(log) Marginal Likelihood 
(log) Marginal Posterior
New Keynesian Model 
-714.274609 
-712.119858
Banking Frictions 
-706.164137 
-705.530559
Second, I further check how well the moments generated by both models 
match the typical business cycle measures in the data, namely standard devia­
tions, correlation with output and autocorrelation. Table 2 displays this com­
parison and it clearly show that the result obtained with the marginal likelihood 
comparison is reflected in the second moments. The standard deviations with 
respect to output generated by the banking model do a relatively better job in 
matching the data. The difference is not so marked but the second moments 
generated by the Banking model are consistently closer to the data. However, 
the standard deviation of consumption is biased upward. As McAdam and Lom­
bardo (2012) point out, this is not an entirely surprising result since it reflects the 
weakness of the standard Euler approach in modeling consumption. As in the 
standard deviation case, the correlation with output is relatively better matched 
with the banking model. Finally, like the previous second moments, the auto­
correlation of order one shows a preference of the banking model in matching the 
data. As before, the difference is small but it the Bank model has values closer
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to the data in all the variables considered. As figure 3 shows, this is further 
confirmed for the autocorrelation up to the fifth order.
These results confirm further the findings of Table 1. In an environment 
without financial data a model with a single financial friction has relatively 
better empirical properties than the plain vanilla New Keynesian model.
Inflation Hours Worked
Interest Rate
Figure 3 - Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the Estimated
Models - No Financial Data
2.3.2 W ith  Financial D ata
Turning to the second comparison (tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix), which 
involves the banking frictions models and the model with both demand and 
supply-side financial frictions, I now have an extra observable (BAA corporate 
bond yields), which poses an extra challenge in terms of fitting the data.
In terms of the estimated parameters, the differences are more sigmficant
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than those of the first exercise, although in most cases the confidence intervals 
still overlap. For example, the banking frictions model suggest points to a lot 
less price and wage stickiness, as well as habit persistence, than the full model 
(and the results discussed previously). The most striking difference is the invest­
ment adjustment costs parameter 4>x, which is significantly lower than previously 
estimated, and almost zero in the case of the banking frictions model, thus sug­
gesting financial frictions may in fact account for the documented kinkiness in 
the dynamics of investment.
Interestingly, the results for the model with the bank and firm frictions sug­
gests that investment shocks and the capital quality shocks are significantly more 
volatile than in the banking frictions model (and a lot more so than in the first 
exercise). This suggests that the capital-investment channel plays a greater role 
in this framework.
Table 3 reports the marginal likelihood the the banking moldel and the 
banking-firms model. Estimation results reveal that introducing both frictions 
leads to a quite significant improvement in the marginal likelihood, thus sug­
gesting that these additional transmission mechanisms are indeed empirically 
relevant in explaining the dynamics in the extended dataset. In this case the dif­
ference is more marked than in the previous exercise. The difference between the 
banking frictions model and the model with banking and entrepeneural frictions 
is around 30.
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Table 3 Second Exercise
(log) Marginal Likelihood 
(log) Marginal Posterior
Banking Frictions 
-1019.649516 
-1019.567884
Banking-Firms Frictions 
-992.066102 
-991.701936
This is further confirmed by the analysis of the second moments. As in 
the first exercise, I compare the relative standard deviations with respect to 
output, the correlation with output and autocorrelation of the banking friction 
model and the banking-firms frictions model with the actual data. The results 
are reported in table 4. The comparison of the standard deviation shows that 
the the banking-firms model has values that are closer to the data. This is 
further confirmed by the correlation with output and the autocorrelations. It is 
important to highlight that, regarding the correlation with output, the model 
with two frictions has values that are very close to the data for investment and 
corporate bonds. This is also true for the autocorrelation up to order five as 
figure 4 shows. This suggests that adding a friction in the entrepreneurial sector 
helps to explain the dynamics of investment in a better way than having a single 
friction. Moreover, This confirms further the result highlighted by the marginal 
likelihood.
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Inflation Hours Worked
Interest Rate
Figure 4 - Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the Estimated
Models - Financial Data
2.4 Quantifying the Im portance of Financial Shocks
In this section I assess the contribution of real and financial shocks to business 
cycle dynamics. As in the previous analysis I analyse the case where the models 
are estimated without financial data and the case where I introduce a financial 
time series in the estimation procedure.
2.4.1 W ithout Financial D ata
In this subsection I assess the importance of real and financial shocks without 
financial data by analysing the variance decomposition of the macroeconomic
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variables implied by the estimated models. With this exercise I want to examine 
the contribution of the eight shocks in the model to the variance of macroeco­
nomic variables at business cycle frequencies. This allow us to decompose the 
total variance and to analyse which are the most important shocks that drive 
the economy.
Table 5
Variance Decomposition - New Keynesian Model
Tech. Gov. Wage
Markup
Pref. Price
M arkup
C.Q.
O u tp u t 15.26 7.64 10.04 28.57 0.10 0.02 12.95 25.41
C o n s u m p tio n 17.04 1.59 11.66 30.58 32.05 0.00 4.51 2.56
I n v e s tm e n t 8.43 0.21 4TW 14.95 8.52 0.04 10.31 53.45
H o u r s  W o rk ed 14.30 7.73 10.16 28.90 0.10 0.02 0.02 25.70
R e a l W a g e 12.80 0.00 0.00 34.58 10.80 0.00 3 2 ^ 1.10
I n f la t io n 10.80 0.60 16.67 6.46 &52 0.01 15.81 40.14
I n te r e s t  R a te 4.97 4.97 59.67 59.67 4.64 0.00 7.37 20.17
Table 5 reports the variance decomposition from the plain vanilla New Key­
nesian model and table 6 reports the variance decomposition for the banking 
model. From this tables two important results emerge.
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Table 6
Variance Decomposition - Banking Model
Tech. Gov, Wage
M arkup
Pref. Price
Markup
C.Q.
O u tp u t 16.22 5 j# &82 33.33 1.55 0.00 13.40 21.46
C o n s u m p tio n 13.34 1.60 5.90 23.63 19.73 0.00 2 j# 32.82
I n v e s tm e n t 7.33 0.13 6.31 16.41 9.72 0.01 10.34 49.75
H o u r s  W o rk ed 1.46 1.21 2.05 54.01 0.77 0.00 &02 3&48
R e a l W a g e 14.34 0.08 5.56 2&58 10.06 0.00 30.73 10.65
I n f la t io n 5.45 0.23 12.99 6.96 5.42 0.00 5.01 63.94
I n te r e s t  R a te &39 Oj# 6.95 5.51 4.56 0.00 2.05 77.25
The first result that emerges from the estimation exercise is that the capital 
quality shock is the main driver of investment and one of the main driver of the 
economy. In the New Keynesian model, it is responsible for 53.45 percent for the 
variance of investment, 40.14 percent for infiation. Though it is not the main 
driver for output, it is responsible for 25.41 percent of the variance, making it 
the second main driver for that variables. Similarly, in the banking model the 
capital quality shock is it is responsible for 49.75 percent for the variance of 
investment, 63.94 percent for infiation, 32.82 for consumption and even 77.25 
percent for the interest rate. For output it is responsible for 21.46, making it, as 
in the previous case, the second main driver.
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The second result is that investment shock (the MEI shock) has no role 
in explaining any of the macroeconomic variables. This result is particularly 
striking given that Justiniano et al. (2010 and 2011) and Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2008), find that the investment shock is the most important driver of the 
US business cycle fiuctuations. To understand this result it is useful to recall 
how these two shocks are defined. Both economic disturbances affect the capital 
accumulation process but the underlying mechanism is fundamentally diff'erent.
The MEI shock is a level shock: it affects the level of investment in the 
capital accumulation identity and it has the effect of increasing the amount of 
investment in the economy and therefore the level of capital. This shock is 
quite standard in the literature and, recently, with the works of Justiniano et al. 
(2010 and 2011), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2008), Fuentes-Albero (2011) and 
Kamber et al. (2012) has been brought under the spotlight for being one of the 
main driver of the US economy. In particular, by estimating a DSGE model, 
Justiniano et al. (2011) make a comprehensive analysis of that shock. In fact, 
they compare the role of the MEI shock with the the 1ST shock, a shock that 
affects the transformation of consumption into investment goods, and they find 
that the latter has a limited role meanwhile the former disturbance explains a 
big part of the macroeconomic variables variance.
The capital quality shock is a disturbance that affects both the level of capital 
and the return on capital and more precisely Tobin’s Q. Its interpretation is
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rather straightforward: it captures changes in values of asset prices given by 
fundamental and non-fundamental changes. As noted by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) boom and bust cycles in asset markets have important effects on the real 
economy. To explain this feature of stock markets they build a DSGE model 
where the stock market price of capital differs from its fundamental value. The 
effect of the asset price disturbance is not different from the one described by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Indeed it may refer to changes in asset prices that 
are unrelated to fundamentals factors.
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Figure 5 - Bayesian Impulse Response Functions - Capital Quality Shock - Banking
Model
Figure 5 shows the impulse response function following a capital quality shock 
in the estimated model with banking frictions. The black solid line represents 
the median response and the area within the red dashed lines represents the 90%
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confidence interval. As expected, the shock increases investment and therefore 
output. Furthermore this creates inflationary pressures. The overall effect is 
similar to the effect of a MEI shock.
Figure 6 shows the impulses response function following an investment shock. 
The amplification mechanism is broadly the same. The main difference relies on 
the amplification effect. The capital quality shock has a higher amplification 
effect compared to the MEI shock therefore it can explain the importance of the 
former disturbance and the negligible effect of the latter disturbance.
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Figure 6 - Bayesian Impulse Response Functions - Investment Shock - Banking Model
Furthermore, the mean estimate of the variance of the asset price shock and the 
investment shock are relatively low (see table 7) being 0.2297 and 0.2294 for 
the New Keynesian model and the banking model respectively. Justiniano et al. 
(2011) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2008) report very high value for the mean
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of the variance of the investment shock. This suggests that, in those cases, the 
variance captures some extra features like an further, unexplored transmission 
channel.
As shown in table 5 the effects of the same macroeconomic disturbances in 
the plain vanilla New Keynesian model are broadly the same. The difference 
between the two models lies in the fact that importance of the capital quality 
shock is higher in the model with banking frictions. As pointed out by Bernanke 
and Gertler (1999) this is due to the balance sheet effect of the banking sector 
and in particular how changes in asset prices are transmitted to the rest of the 
economy. For example, an increase in asset values leads to an unplanned decrease 
in leverage and facilitate the access to credit for potential borrowers.
Moreover, to validate identification, table 7 shows the correlation between 
the investment shock and the capital quality shock in the two models.
Table 7
Correlation Between the Investment Shock and the Capital Quality Shock
New Keynesian Model 0.203
Banking Model 0.194
As the table shows the correlation lies around 0.2 for both model. Given the 
nature of the two shocks this is not entirerly surprising. Both shocks affect the
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capital accumulation identinty but, as explained before, in a different way. The 
investment shock affect the marginal investment while the capital quality shock 
affects investment and the stock of capital (minus depreciation). Furthermore, 
the biggest difference between the two sholks is that the capital quality shock 
affects the return on capital that, as Bernanke and Gertler (1999) shows it is the 
"asset price equation". Therefore, this extra channel explain the result of the 
correlation analysis.
2.4.2 W ith  Financial D ata
In this subsection 1 examine the case of introducing financial data in the estima­
tion.
Table 8
Variance Decomposition - Banking Model
Tech. Gov. Wage
Markup
Pref. Price
M arkup
C.Q..
O u tp u t 18.33 3.21 8.70 22.82 1.96 1.02 11.24 32.72
C o n s u m p tio n 17.95 1^8 7.07 30.09 24.61 4.11 3.75 11.04
I n v e s tm e n t 9.87 0.48 5.55 9.79 11.82 2.72 &07 51.71
H o u rs  W ork ed 1.73 1.13 2fi3 70.77 1.90 2.57 9.60 10.27
R e a l W a g e 18.29 0.18 7.05 23.16 6.43 1.20 33.42 10.28
In fla t io n 6.71 0.39 24.27 3.97 2.92 6.31 4.40 51.03
I n te r e s t  R a te 5.72 0.53 7.98 4.48 3.81 12.58 2.99 61.90
C o r p o r a te  B o n d s 1.77 0.09 4.46 1.37 1.51 29.70 T85 59.26
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Tables 8 and 9 shows the variance decomposition of the banking frictions model 
and the banking-firms frictions respectively.
Table 9
Variance Decomposition - Banking-Firms Model
Tech. Gov. Wage
Markup
Pref. Price
M arkup
C.Q.
O u tp u t 21.91 2.27 7.02 20.95 2.63 1.51 11.49 32.23
C o n s u m p tio n 24.23 1.86 5.83 23.90 19.93 4.02 287 17.35
I n v e s tm e n t 11.05 0.34 3.76 10.29 13.60 4^2 &24 47.40
H o u r s  W o rk ed 286 1.77 1.52 65.70 2.50 2.04 11.83 11.79
R e a l W a g e 0.14 7.27 15.56 4.40 0.64 31.04 15.96
In f la t io n 7.67 0.21 18^ 52 4.63 3.58 5.11 289 57.39
I n te r e s t  R a te 7.45 0.46 5.01 6.04 7.11 9.09 2J2 62.51
C o r p o r a te  B o n d s 2.94 0.11 5.05 2.07 256 12.42 2.91 71.94
As in the previous exercise two results emerge. The first one is that, like in 
the case without financial variables, the capital quality shock is one important 
driver for the economy. In the banking friction model it accounts for the 51.71 
percent of the variance of investment, 59.26 of the variance of the corporate 
bonds, 61.90 of the variance of the interest rate and 51.03 of the variance of 
inflation. In the banking-firms frictions model the importance of such shock is 
further magnified. This disturbance it is responsible for 47.40 percent for the 
variance of investment, 62.51 for the interest rate, 57.39 percent for inflation and
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even 71.94 for the corporate bonds yields . More importantly, in this case, it is 
the main driver for output, and it is responsible for 32.23 percent of the variance.
The second result is related to the investment shock. Contrary to the first 
exercise, in this case it as a relatively small importance. For example, if I con­
sider the investment it accounts for 2.72 and 4.32 for the banking model and 
the banking-firms model respectively. In the same fashion, it accounts for 1.02 
and 1.51 respectively for output. However the investment shock has a relative 
importance for the corporate bonds. It accounts for 29.70 for the banking model 
and 12.42 the banking-firms model.
2.5 Extending the Analysis to  the Recent Fi­
nancial Crisis
In this section I study the impact of the recent financial crisis. As stated in 
the introduction it had strong repercussions on the real economy therefore it 
is natural to analyse the impact that it has on the models. To this extent, I 
estimate the models using data up to the second quarter of 2013. This is a 
particularly interesting extensions since it highilits the role of financial frictions 
in a period of financial distress. As before I divide the analysis in two separate 
exercises. The first one is a comparison without financial data and the second 
one is a comparison with financial data. Table 10 and 11 show the marginal
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likelihood of the two exercises.
From the tables a clear results emerges. In both exercises the difference 
between the two models is wider. When the financial crisis is condiered, the 
difference between the New Keynesian model and the Banking model in the 
first exercises rises from 6.5 to 10. In the second exercise this is even more 
pronounced. In this case, the difference between the Banking model and the 
Banking-Firms model is around 158. This difference is mainly due to the great 
drop in investment that occoured after 2008 and to the increased difference of 
the spread between the BAA corporate bond yields and the interest rate. This 
clearly shows that the model with two frictions does a particularly good job in 
capturing periods of financial distress.
Table 10 First Exercise
(log) Marginal Likelihood 
(log) Marginal Posterior
New Keynesian Model Banking Frictions 
-831.268192 -821.376393 
-830.593886 -821.376393
Table 11 Second Exercise
(log) Marginal Likelihood 
(log) Marginal Posterior
Banking Frictions Banking-Firms Frictions 
-1149.199068 -991.991060 
-1149.106062 -991.724886
Table 11 and 12 show the variance decomposition for the two exercises. As
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expected, the results highilight a greater importance of the finacial shock. The 
capital quality shock captures a greater amount of the variance decomposition 
for investment and output in both exercises.
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Table 12
Variance Decomposition - First Exercise - New Keynesian Model
Tech. Gov. Wage Pref. Price C.Q ..
Markup Markup
O u tp u t 16.30 6.63 7.55 29.04 202 0.01 14.29 28.14
C o n s u m p tio n 11.76 1.30 6.47 27.49 20.22 0.00 2.86 29.90
I n v e s tm e n t 9.04 0.33 2^G 12.13 13.36 0.02 10.27 55.93
H o u r s  W o rk ed 0.75 0.63 0.41 53.85 0.56 0.00 6.76 37.03
R e a l W a g e 13.14 0.09 7.00 23.65 9.90 0.00 33j# 3&d2
In f la t io n 4.44 0.34 8T# 5^6 4.41 0.00 3.50 73^7
I n te r e s t  R a te 2.31 Oj& 3^8 &88 2.79 0.00 1.40 85^W
Table 13
Variance Decomposition - First Exercise - Banking Model
Tech. Gov. Mon. Wage Pref. Inv. C.Q..
M arkup Markup
O u tp u t 15.89 1.29 7.96 32.09 1.89 0.00 13.73 24.17
C o n s u m p tio n 13.31 1.87 5.48 27.92 21.17 0.00 3.10 27.15
I n v e s tm e n t 7.65 0.17 5.90 13.66 238 0.01 10.63 52.6
H o u r s  W o rk ed 1.13 1.16 1.48 63.03 0.90 0.00 12.71 19.59
R e a l W a g e 13.99 0.10 5.42 24.99 10.22 0.00 36T# 9.24
I n f la t io n 4.99 0.36 14.78 6.29 6.03 0.00 5 j# 62.28
I n te r e s t  R a te 3^7 0.41 6.50 5.67 5.47 0.00 3.43 76.25
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Table 14
Variance Decomposition - Second Exercise - Banking Model
Tech. Gov. Wage
Markup
Pref. Price
Markup
C.Q..
O u tp u t 17.12 3.70 8.19 22.52 2.91 0.63 10.33 33.60
C o n s u m p tio n 17.19 1.72 6.56 31.79 28.28 2.71 222 252
I n v e s tm e n t 8.67 &38 5.50 9.53 10.93 1.49 9.53 53.97
H o u rs  W ork ed 1.39 1.26 1.65 69.00 284 1.57 15.03 7.26
R e a l W a g e 18.35 0.18 &24 20.83 6.14 0.93 37.09 10.24
In f la t io n 5.56 0.63 21.95 6.73 2.70 6.35 204 48.05
I n te r e s t  R a te 4.86 0.78 &83 6.95 6.00 11.27 8.90 54.41
C o r p o r a te  B o n d s 2.34 0.08 &33 225 2.40 27.15 228 57.17
Table 15
Variance Decomposition - Second Exercise - Banking-Firms Model
Tech. Gov. Wage
Markup
Pref. Irrv.
M arkup
C.Q..
O u tp u t 20.98 227 7.05 19.95 2.56 1.49 11.41 34.27
C o n s u m p tio n 24.31 1.85 5.96 24.16 19.87 3.97 2.94 16.94
I n v e s tm e n t 11.19 0.36 3.78 9.30 11.52 4 j# 9.15 50.41
H o u r s  W ork ed 2.87 1.77 1.53 65.65 2.47 2.05 11.82 11.82
R e a l W a g e 24.86 0.14 7.26 15.64 436 0.64 31.00 16.09
I n fla t io n 7.71 0.22 18.50 4.56 3.49 5.11 2jW 57.51
I n te r e s t  R a te 7.51 0.47 5.00 5.94 6.93 9.14 229 62.73
C o r p o r a te  B o n d s &95 0.11 5.04 2.05 2.52 12.63 287 71.84
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter developed a New Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions on 
the banking side and on the firms’ side to study the impact of multiple frictions 
on business cycle dynamics. To this extent, a set of model comparison, through 
Bayesian estimation, has been performed. The analysis focused on the ability of 
the models in explaining financial and non financial data. The first comparison 
focused on the role of non financial data. In this exercise I compared a plain 
Vanilla New Keynesian model with banking friction model. The second exercises 
focused on the role of financial data and for this exercise I compared the model 
with two frictions I developed with a model with a banking friction. Bayesian 
estimation highlighted four key results. The first one highlights the supremacy 
of the banking friction model over the New Keynesian model in explaining non 
financial data. The second one is the banking and an entrepreneurial sector 
friction outperforms the model with the banking sector friction in explaining 
financial data. The third one is that the capital quality shock is a key driver of 
business cycle fluctuations. Finally, the fourth result states that the dynamics 
of the investment shock are captured by the capital quality shock and this shock 
plays a negligible role.
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A ppendix A  - The solution to the Banks’ and 
Entrepreneurs’ Problem  in the Full M odel
A1 - The solution  to  th e  banks’ problem
The objective of the bank is to maximize it’s value function give by eq. (2.6) 
subject to the incentive constraint given by eq. (2.5). The Lagrangian for this 
problem is:
A  =  [V f -  e^Lt] =  (1 +  \ ) V f  -  (2.83)
Combining eq. (2.6) and eq (2.1) 1 obtain:
V f  = ( v l - v l ) L t  + v l N W f  (2.84)
Therefore the Lagrangian can be expressed as:
A  =  (1 +  A,) [(vl -  v l)L t + v lN W f]  -  (2.85)
The optimization yields the following first order conditions for Lt and At:
(^L — ^'£)(1 +  At) =  At^  ^ (2.86)
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-  [ i f  -  „g)] A  =  (2.87)
Eq. (2.86) states that when the incentive constraint binds the marginal value of 
the banks assets (loans) is greater then the marginal cost of funding (deposits). 
Eq. (2.87) is the incentive constraint. It states that the banks’ net work has to 
be at least as large as a fraction of the banks’ assets.
When the constraint binds 1 have that:
-- >" 0 (2.518)
so I  can rewrite eq. (2.87) as:
(2.89)
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A2 - The solution  to  the entrepreneurs’ problem
Entrepreneurs want to maximize the value function represented by eq. (2.22) 
subject to the incentive constraint stated in eq. (2.21). The Lagrangian that 
solves this problem is:
A  =  V f  +  A [V f -  0’^ QtKt] =  (1 +  \ t ) V f  -  XtO’^ QtKt (2.90)
If I combine eq (22) and eq(28) I can express the value of the entrepreneur as:
(2.91)
The Langrangian becomes:
Ct = {1 + \t)
,E
Q t
-  XtO^QtKt (2.92)
The first order conditions for this problem are:
ÿ  ) (1 +  AO = (2.93)
QtKt = v fN W f (2.94)
Eq. (2.93) states that when the incentive constraint binds the marginal return 
of capital is always greater than the cost of the loans. Eq. (2.94) is the incentive
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constraint, and implies that the level of entrepreneurs’ net wort is as large as a 
fraction of the capital. Eq. (2.93) states that:
> 0 (2.95)
This implies that eq. (2.94) can be written as:
,E
(2L96)
Ü -  lit
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A ppendix B - The solution to the Banks’ Prob­
lem  in the Banking M odel
B1 - T he M odel w ith  B anks’ Frictions.
This real part of the economy is the same as the one of the full case. The main
difference is that there are no frictions on at entrepreneurial level. This implies
that the lending rate Ri is equal to the marginal return on capital Rk and that 
the capital correspond to the security issued by the banks. This implies:
St = Kt+i (2.97)
Therefore 1 have that:
QtSt = (f)tNWt (2.98)
where (f)t is equal to:
(2.99)
and:
^d,t — E t D  F t ^ t + i ^ t + i O - +  R t + i )  (2 .100)
lit = EtDFt^t+i^t+i{Ri^t+i — Rt+i) (2.101)
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where üt is the shadow value of a unit of net worth and is equal to:
Qt =  1 — <7b +  0'B{Tld,t +  4‘tf t^) “  1 “  (2.102)
At an aggregate level net worth is the sum of existing bankers and new bankers:
A4 =  Ne,t +  A4%,t (2.103)
Net worth of existing entrepreneurs equals earnings on assets held in the previous 
period net cost of deposit finance, multiplied by a fraction 6, the probability that 
they survive until the current period:
N W l,  =  0{{l  +  Rif, Q t-iS t-i  -  (1 +  Rt) A - i }  (2.104)
Since new bankers cannot operate without any net worth, 1 assume that the 
family transfers to each one the fraction ^ /( l — <j) of the total value assets of 
exiting entrepreneurs. This implies:
+  (2.105)
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A ppendix C - Expressing Summations as Differ­
ence Equations
In the first order conditions for the wage rigidities and the Calvo contracts and 
expressions for value functions we are confronted with expected discunted sums 
of the general form:
Qf =  Et
,A:=0
(2.106)
where Xt t^+k can be expressed as Xtf,+k = Xt^t+iXt+i,t+k- From this 1 can express 
the following lemma.
Lemma
Vit can be expressed as:
Vit — Xt^t^t +  l^Et (2.107)
P roof
Vit — Xt^t'^t +  Et 
= Xt^t^t +  Et
k= l 
oo
'^^Xt,t+k'+iyt+k'+i
—  X t ^ V E t  +  E t  
= Xt^tYt +  ^Et
Lfc'=o
OO
'^ X^t+i^ t+iXt^ t+k'+iy't+k'+i
ik '= 0
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A ppendix D - Tables
Table 16 
Calibration
Common Parameters Value
id 0.99
a 0.7
Q 0.7097
c 7
c l / c
NK Model
d 0.0202
Banking Model
d 0.0252
0.972
0.0021
0.3847
Full Model
0.0332
0.972
0.0021
0.7902
0.972
0.0021
0.3847
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Table  17
Prio r  and  Pos te r ior d is tr ibution F ir s t Exercise - New Keynes ian Model
Prio r Posterior
Func tion Mean Std . Dev. 5% 95%
S tru c tu ra l  Param ete rs
Normal 2 1.5 0.5256 0.2288 0.7962
Normal 1.5 0.375 1.2824 0.8001 1.8373
i Beta 0.5 0.1 0.6735 0.6106 0.7360
Beta 0.5 0.1 0.5709 0.4524 0.7731
I p B eta 0.5 0.15 0.6581 0.4601 0.8698
'Iw B eta 0.5 0.15 0.4866 0.2428 0.7210
X Beta 0.7 0.1 0.6426 0.5225 0.5225
p Beta 0.75 0.1 0.6816 0.6231 0.7382
e . Normal 1.5 0.25 1.9404 1.7104 2.1669
6 y B eta 0.120 0.05 0.0226 0.0074 0.0074
AR(1) Coefficients
Pa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9741 0.9605 0.9889
Pg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9392 0.9000 0.9807
P w Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9275 0.8051 0.8051
Pb Beta 0.5 0.2 0.7196 0.3689 0.9077
Pi Beta 0.5 0.2 0.5197 0.1947 0.8379
Pp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8406 0.7662 0.9122
PCQ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9766 0.9600 0.9958
Std .Dev. Shocks
ClA Inverse Gam m a 0.1 2 0.8180 0.7283 0.9086
<^ G Inverse G am m a 0.5 2 1.3256 1.1767 1.4606
a w Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 3.2485 1.8079 5.8451
d p Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.4494 0.9675 1.9580
0-/ Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2936 0.0195 0.0195
a p Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.2091 0.9164 1.5038
dM Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2748 0.2748 0.3106
dRP Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2297 0.1306 0.3466
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Table 18
Prior and Posterior distribution - First Exercise - Banking Model
Prior Poste rio r
Func tion M ean !3td. Dev. Mean 5% 95%
S tru c tu ra l  P a ram ete rs
Normal 2 1.5 1.0260 0.4863 1.5823
Normal 1.5 0.375 1.0972 0.7513 0.7513
î Beta 0.5 0.1 0.6767 0.6236 0.7335
Beta 0.5 0.1 0.5154 0.4276 0.6033
Ip Beta 0.5 0.15 0.6038 0.3928 0.8413
I w Beta 0.5 0.15 0.8413 0.8413 0.7269
X Beta 0.7 0.1 0.5992 0.5124 0.6863
p Beta 0.75 0.1 0.7269 0.6171 0.7255
e . Normal 1.5 0.25 2.0495 1.8305 2.2699
Beta 0.125 0.05 0.0236 0.0086 0.0387
AR(1) Coefficients
Pa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9719 0.9564 0.9878
Pg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9417 0.9033 0.9824
P w Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9505 0.9168 0.9856
Pb Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8350 0.7693 0.9057
Pi Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9057 0.1741 0.8258
Pp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8511 0.7814 0.9248
PCQ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9557 0.9219 0.9907
Std .Dev . Shocks
dA Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.8042 0.7163 0.7163
Inverse Gam m a 0.5 2 1.3277 1.1860 1.4745
U w Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 2.4816 1.9305 3.0086
Cg Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.3851 1.0999 1.6674
CTJ Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.0810 0.0244 0.1466
d p Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.1869 0.9309 0.9309
O’M Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2805 0.2447 0.3167
<lR P Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2294 0.1534 0.3007
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Table 19
Prio r  and Pos te r ior  d is tr ibution  ■ Second Exercise -■ Bank ing Model
P rio r Poste rio r
Func tion Mean Std . Dev. M ean 5% 95%
S tru c tu ra l  Param ete rs
Normal 2 1.5 0.3598 0.2502 0.4615
Normal 1.5 0.375 1.7014 1.3159 2.0958
Beta 0.5 0.1 0.6248 0.5721 0.6754
Beta 0.5 0.1 0.4613 0.3798 0.5396
I P Beta 0.5 0.15 0.4652 0.2152 0.6984
' ïw Beta 0.5 0.15 0.5189 0.2746 0.7601
X Beta 0.7 0.1 0.5024 0.4124 0.5923
p Beta 0.75 0.1 0.6683 0.6210 0.7171
e . Normal 1.5 0.25 2.1962 1.9672 2.4140
By Beta 0.120 0.005 0.0177 0.0060 0.0290
AR(1) Coefficients
Pa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9746 0.9606 0.9881
Pg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9374 0.8970 0.9804
P w Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9804 0.9415 0.9903
Pb Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8852 0.8261 0.9478
Pi Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9581 0.9423 0.9742
Pp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8826 0.8285 0.9415
Pg q Beta 0.5 0.2 0.5000 0.4276 0.5697
Std .Dev . Shocks
(^A Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.8517 0.7580 0.9466
(^G Inverse Gam m a 0.5 2 1.3271 1.1776 1.4649
a w Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 2.1474 1.7342 2.5590
(Tg Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.4173 1.0715 1.7550
0-/ Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 2.0040 1.7160 2.2938
d p Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.0164 0.8430 1.1840
<^M Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2874 0.2500 0.3235
<^ CQ Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.0669 0.9091 1.2217
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Table 20
P rio r and Poster io r  d is tr ibu tion  -■ Second Exercise - Banking-F irms Model
Poste rio r
Funct ion Mean Std.  Dev. 5% 95%
S tru c tu ra l  P a ram e te r s
4>X Normal 2 1.5 0.2473 0.1743 0.3189
Normal 1.5 0.375 1.4639 1.1183 1.8152
i Beta 0.5 0.1 0.6024 0.5524 0.6522
B eta 0.5 0.1 0.4264 0.3496 0.5045
T p Beta 0.5 0.15 0.4800 0.2293 0.7193
' ïw Beta 0.5 0.15 0.5223 0.2819 0.7676
X Beta 0.7 0.1 0.4870 0.4026 0.5710
P Beta 0.75 0.1 0.6815 0.6338 0.7287
e . Normal 1.5 0.25 2.3566 2.1289 2.5851
6 y Beta 0.120 0.005 0.0268 0.0106 0.0428
AR(1) Coefficients
Pa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9806 0.9708 0.9909
Pg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9461 0.9117 0.9836
P w Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9660 0.9438 0.9883
Pb Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8963 0.8385 0.9518
Pi Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9709 0.9505 0.9931
Pp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9005 0.8504 0.9518
Pr p Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6811 0.6436 0.7205
Std.Dev. Shocks
Inverse Gam m a 0.1 2 0.9445 0.8394 1.0516
d G Inverse Gam m a 0.5 2 1.3391 1.1923 1.4829
a w Inverse Gam m a 0.1 2 2.0014 1.6341 2.3394
<^B Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.4017 1.0136 1.7658
c r i Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 1.1779 0.9475 0.9475
a p Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.9596 0.8099 1.1063
ctm Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.2898 0.2518 0.3264
dRP Inverse G am m a 0.1 2 0.8206 0.7165 0.7165
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Appendix E - Figures
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Figure 7 - Multivariate Diagnostic for the NK Model 
Estimated Without Financial Data
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Figure 8 - Multivariate Diagnostic for the Banking
Model Estimated without Financial Data.
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Interval
Figure 9 - Multivariate Diagnostic for the Banking
Model Estimated with Financial Data.
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Figure 10 - Multivariate Diagnostic for the Bank and
Firm Model Estimated with Financial Data.
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Figure 11 - Priors and Posteriors - F irst Com parison - New Keynesian
Model
Figure 12 - Priors and Posteriors - First Comparison - New Keynesian
Model.
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Figure 13 - Priors and Posteriors - F irst Comparison - New Keynesian
Model.
Figure 14 - Priors and Posteriors - First Comparison - Banking Model.
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Figure 15 - Priors and Posteriors - F irst Comparison - Banking Model.
Figure 14 - Priors and Posteriors - First Comparison - Banking Model
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Figure 15 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Comparison - Banking Model
Figure 16 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Com parison - Banking Model.
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Figure 17 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Comparison - Banking Model.
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Figure 18 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Com parison - Banking-Firm s Model.
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Figure 19 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Com parison - Banking-Firm s Model
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Figure 20 - Priors and Posteriors - Second Com parison - Banking-Firm s Model.
Chapter 3
Capital Flows, Financial
Interm ediation and
M acroprudential Policies
In the wake of the global financial crisis, it is increasingly recognized that cen­
tral banks have a dual role in maintaining both price and financial stability. 
A key missing ingredient was an overarching policy framework responsible for 
systemic financial stability. Neither macroeconomic policymakers nor pruden­
tial regulators were in charge of ensuring the stability of the financial system 
as a whole. ^  One of the discerning features of this crisis has been that shocks 
originating in credit markets have resulted in a “great recession” and large-scale
igee Vinals (2010).
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unemployment. Against this backdrop, there have been increased calls for bet­
ter understanding macro-financial linkages and the development of a policy that 
can explicitly focus on system wide risks and macroprudential framework (IMF 
2011a).
Managing the macroeconomic stability implications of large capital inflows 
and build-up of systemic risks is of particular importance to the Philippines.^ 
Policymakers face two sets of interrelated challenges: (i) to prevent capital 
flows from exacerbating macroeconomic overheating pressures and consequent 
inflation, and (ii) to minimize the risk that prolonged periods of easy financ­
ing conditions will undermine financial stability. Given Asia’s past experience 
with credit and/or asset valuation boom-bust cycles, macroprudential measures 
could be particularly useful in reducing the procyclicality of financial systems 
and, therefore, the amplitude of business cycles.^ While debate continues on 
the appropriate tools and structures for successful mitigation of systemic risk^, I 
consider the policy implications of implementing a macroprudential overlay that 
could accompany the traditional microprudential and macroeconomic policy.
This chapter develops an open economy DSGE model with an optimizing 
banking sector to assess the role of capital flows, macro-financial linkages, and 
macroprudential policies in the Philippines. It specifically looks at (1) the impact
^The analysis of this paper is centered on the Philippines but can be easily extended to 
several Asian countries (see Maino and Barnett (2011)).
^See Craig, Davis, and Pascual (2006) for evidence on the procyclicality of Asian financial 
markets.
^See Bank of International Settlements (BIS henceforth) 2010.
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of capital inflows on the economy; (2) the monetary transmission mechanism in 
the presence of a banking sector and financial frictions; (3) the effects of finan­
cial stability shocks; and (4) the potential role for macroprudential policies in 
maintaining macro-financial stability including their interactions with monetary 
policy.
1 introduce a banking sector modelled after Gertler and Karadi (2011) and 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) augmented with macroprudential policy in the form 
of capital requirements. Such sector creates a financial accelerator effect on the 
supply side of funding where the lending constraint is relaxed when banks’ net 
worth increases. Such mechanism fosters inefficient economic fluctuations (such 
as excess volatility in lending, investment and output) which can be mitigated by 
macroprudential policy tools that increase (reduce) the cost to banks of extending 
(shrinking) credit in good (bad) times.
In such scenario, macroprudential measures can usefully complement mone­
tary policy. Gountercyclical macroprudential polices can help reduce macroeco­
nomic volatility and enhance welfare in combination with a modified Taylor rule. 
The results also demonstrate the importance of capital fiows and financial stabil­
ity for business cycle fluctuations as well as for supply-side financial accelerator 
effects in the amplification and propagation of shocks.
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3.1 Background
Capital inflows to the Philippines have surged at the beginning of 2010. There 
have been two other major episodes of capital inflows to the Philippines and 
emerging Asia more generally over the past two decades. The first episode be­
gan in the early 1990s and ended abruptly with the 1997 — 98 Asian financial 
crisis; the second began in the early 2000s and again ended abruptly with the 
global financial crisis.^ What is remarkable about the current episode is that the 
surge in capital inflows to the Philippines has been larger than previous episodes, 
particularly portfolio and other inflows. Net inflows to the Philippines were at 
historical highs in absolute terms and as a percent of GDP by the end of 2010. 
This contrasts with the rest of Asia where overall net capital flows to emerging 
Asia as a share of GDP have been generally lower than in previous capital in­
flow surges, although the aggregate numbers hide some sizable variations across 
countries and types of flows.®
Recent data suggest a continuation of inflows to the Philippines despite re­
newed turbulence in global financial markets. Net fiows to equity market funds 
appear to have recovered from the dip induced by higher global risk aversion 
in August-October while the record level of portfolio inflows have held up in 
the most recent quarterly Balance of Payments data. Other fiows have fallen as 
expected due to the retrenchment of credit lines by foreign financial institutions
®See the Asian Pacific Regional Economic Outlook (AP-REO henceforth) of April 2010 
G see AP-REO of April 2011.
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particularly European banks but cushioned to an extent by the repatriation of 
off-shore investments by domestic entities.
Capital flows to the Philippines can be attributed to both external “push” 
factors and domestic “pull” factors. The 2011 IMF article IV staff report on the 
Philippines assessed the importance of these factors by estimating a quarterly 
time series Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedas- 
ticity (EGARCH) model of non-FDI inflows to the Philippines from 1990-2011. 
The results suggest that the most important factors driving net capital inflows 
are the growth differential relative to the United States, interest rate differentials, 
the degree of global risk aversion (proxied for by the VIX index), and exchange 
rate changes. In particular:
• A percentage point increase in the growth differential relative to the U.S. is 
associated with an increase of non-FDI inflows to the Philippines of about 
one percent GDP.
• A reduction in global risk aversion equivalent to a 1 percentage point 
decline in the VIX index increases non-FDI inflows by close to one-tenth 
of a percent of GDP.
• On average, a 1 percentage point increase in interest rate differentials in­
creases net inflows by just over one-tenth percent of GDP.
A one percent appreciation in the peso-dollar exchange rate “pulls”  ^ per-
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cent of GDP in non-FDI inflows to the Philippines.
The outlook for capital flows to the Philippines is strong given expected pat­
terns for the main underlying factors. As the growth differential of the Philip­
pines with the U.S. is signiflcant and low interest rates in advanced countries 
is expected to last much longer, with the Fed announcing an unchanged level 
until 2013, capital inflows to the Philippines could remain strong in 2012 — 13. 
However, susceptibility to the VIX also exposes the Philippines to sudden-stops 
in capital flows related to spikes in global risk-aversion. Further Quantitative 
Easing (QE) in the U.S. would only add to the positive sentiment towards the 
Philippines, although it is not clear that there is an independent, or at least 
quantitatively large, role of QE besides the prolonged lower interest rate chan­
nel.^
Capital inflows present opportunities, but they can also pose macroeconomic 
and financial risks. The inflows, if channeled effectively, represent an opportunity 
to address long-standing investment needs, such as in infrastructure. However, 
capital inflows need to be managed carefully in order to avoid macroeconomic 
and financial risks. Inflows can increase liquidity and boost domestic demand 
and asset prices.
measure of global liquidity (G-4 money gap) was an insignificant determinant of capital 
inflows to the Philippines. There may be an additional channel, however, as QE makes short­
term funding cheap and can encourage “carry-trade,” fixed-income type of fiows. The recent 
surge in bond fiows to Asia and the Philippines may reflect such a channel.
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Figure 1 - Capital Inflows in the Philippines. The black line represents the growth of
capital inflows.
In the Philippines, the empirical relationship between non-FDI capital in­
flows and domestic demand is strong. The main channel through which the 
relationship seems to work is by expanding credit and reducing the cost of eq­
uity finance.® Easier external financial conditions enhance the lending capacity 
of domestic banks and expand the volume of bank resources available. Even in 
a situation where banks do not rely on wholesale external funding, there may 
be a tendency to relax lending standards with the easing of external financial 
conditions. Rapid credit growth raises risks for asset quality and bank capital, 
particularly once the credit cycle matures. Asia’s past history also suggests that 
high liquidity growth at a time of large capital inflows increases the risk of asset 
price boom and bust cycles®, that could lead to potential feed-back loops between
® Conceptually, the real cost of equity (i.e., the implied rate of return required by investors) 
is equal to the sum of the risk-free interest rate and the equity risk premium. At a time of 
capital inflows, the relative appeal of capital investment increases, making it easier for firms 
to borrow from banks based on their greater networth.
9See the AP-REO of April 2010.
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the corporate/household sector and banks. The AP-REO of October 2011 con­
firms that episodes of rapid credit growth in Asia have been characterized by a 
higher incidence of crises relative to other emerging economies.
3.2 Literature R eview
The importance of financial shocks in terms of how they affect the real econ­
omy has long been realized but most of the general equilibrium models devel­
oped to study macro-financial linkages have focused only on the demand side of 
credit markets. In particular, Kyotaki and Moore (1997) Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1999), and lacoviello (2005), have introduced credit and col­
lateral requirements to analyze the transmission and amplification of financial 
shocks.These models have abstracted from modehng the banking sector explic­
itly, and assume that credit transactions take place through the market (thereby 
not assigning any role to financial intermediaries such as banks). The credit 
spread that arises in equilibrium (the external finance premium) is a function 
of the riskiness of the entrepreneurs’ investment projects and/or his net wealth. 
Banks, operating under perfect competition, simply accommodate the chang­
ing conditions from the demand side. The growing importance of banks in the 
modern financial system and the global crisis has demonstrated that the role of 
financial intermediation cannot be overlooked, and I need to model the supply 
of credit to understand business cycle fluctuations better. Also, modeling credit
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supply is essential to study the transmission of shocks originating in the credit 
markets or financial stability risks.
This chapter instead builds on the idea that supply side conditions of credit 
markets are key to shape business cycle dynamics. In the model, financial fric­
tions affect real activity via the impact of funds available to banks. Other papers 
such as Anand, Saxegaard, and Peiris (2010), Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007), 
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2009), 
N’Diaye (2009) and Unsal (2011) have a demand-side “financial accelerator” 
framework but lacks a full-specific banking sector to gauge financial stability and 
credit supply shocks. The model is a standard New Keynesian open-economy 
DSGE model with an optimizing banking sector a la Gertler and Karadi (2011) 
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and a countercyclical capital requirement as 
in Angelini et al. (2010). Further details of the model structure are specified in 
the next section.
This chapter takes capital requirements as the choice of macroprudential in­
strument for two main reasons. First, based on past experience systemic crises 
inevitably affect bank capital and the supply of credit, either directly or indi­
rectly. And, not surprisingly, bank capital has taken centre stage in the ongoing 
debate on regulatory reform. The countercyclical capital rule can be viewed as 
an example of the countercyclical capital buffer introduced by Basel III. Second, 
countercyclical risk weights and provisioning rates have been used frequently in
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Asia and the Philippines as a tool of macroprudential policy, which also predom­
inantly works through a bank capital channel.
3.3 The M odel
The core framework is an open economy model along the lines of Obstfield and 
Rogoff (1995), Gall and Monacelli (2002) and Gertler et al. (2007). The key 
modification is the inclusion of a microfounded banking sector as developed 
by Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The financial 
accelerator mechanism in the banking sector finks the demand for loans (and 
therefore for capital) to the balance sheet of banks. As a consequence, a shock 
in the economy is amplified via the balance sheet of the bank.
In the model there are three players: households, banks and firms. House­
holds work, deposit savings in the banks and consume a basket of home produced 
and foreign goods and they face financial frictions as in Benigno (2009). The 
banking sector collects deposits from households, make loans to firms and it 
faces an agency problem that limits the amount of deposits from households. 
Firms are divided in capital producers, goods producers and a retailers and their 
structure is fairly standard. Gapital producers produced capital used by goods 
producers to produce final output. The role of the retail sector is to provide the 
source of nominal price stickiness.
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3.3.1 H ouseholds
There is a continuum of identical households who consume, save and work. Each 
household deposit funds in a bank. Deposits take the form of riskless one period 
securities. Within the households, there is a fraction zu of bankers and a fraction 
1 — m of workers. Bankers manages a financial intermediary and transfers non 
negative dividends to the households. Workers supply labour and return their 
wages to the households. Bankers remain engaged in their business activity next 
period with a probability 6 which is independent of history. This finite survival 
scheme is needed to avoid that bankers accumulate enough wealth to remove the 
funding constraint. Upon exiting, a banker transfers retained earnings to the 
households and becomes a worker. As a consequence, in each period (1 — 9)w 
workers become bankers, keeping the number in each group constant. Moreover, 
each new banker receives a transfer from the household since they cannot start 
the banking activity without funds.
C onsum ption Com posites. Consumption index Ct consists of home- 
produced Ch and foreign Cp goods:
1
(3.1)
The corresponding Dixit-Stiglitz price indices is:
Pc,t = +  (1 -  wo){PF,ty-'‘°] (3.2)
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Standard intra-temporal optimizing decisions for home consumers lead to:
/  p  \  ~i^ c
CH.t =  C, (3.3)
CF,t = ( ^ )  " ' ' o  (3.4)
The real exchange rate can be defined as the relative aggregate consumption 
price RERc,t =  where St is the nominal exchange rate. As a consequence, 
foreign counterparts of the above defining demand for the export of the home 
goods are
where and Pj ^  denote the price of home consumption, aggregate con­
sumption and aggregate investment goods in foreign currency and 1 have used 
the law of one namely StPp^t ~  Again I define
%  =  K (P A t) '" ''°  +  (1 -  w 6 )(% )'-"M  ^  (3.6)
and Pj similarly.
As in Benigno (2009) I assume that households face financial frictions when 
they purchase foreign bonds. There are two non-contingent one-period bonds 
denominated in the currencies of each bloc with payments in period t, Bn,t and
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respectively in (per capita) aggregate. The prices of these bonds are given
by
where (/»(•) captures the cost in the form of a risk premium for home households 
to hold foreign bonds, is the aggregate foreign asset position of the economy 
denominated in home currency and is nominal GDP. I assume ^(0) =  0
and (f) < ^. Rn,t and P * . denote the nominal interest rate over the interval 
[t,t +  1). The term FLt represents a term that decreases the risk premium. 
Since this boosts foreign borring, I refer to this disurbance as a foreign borrowing 
shock that evolves according to the following process:
log  =  Pf l  log  ( H )  +  (3 .7 )
where epB,t is an indepented and indentically normal distribuited process with 
zero mean and standard deviation apB.
T he H ousehold’s Decision Problem . The representative household max­
im izes:
1 —CT
-  1-  Ua - LI
E, E  ^ ---------- (3-8)
«=0
where Et is the expectation operator indicating expectation formed at time t, /5 
is the discount factor, Lt are hours worked and % is the consumption habit.
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The representative household is subject to the following budget constraint: 
Pc,tCt+ Dt +P B , t B i i , t + = Wtht+ RtDt-i -\-BH,t-i+ +Pt
where Pc,t is a Dixit-Stightz price, Wt is the wage rate, TLt are lump-sum taxes 
net of transfers and Ft are dividends from ownership of firms.
C onsum ption Allocation, Labour Supply and  Savings. The intertem­
poral and labour supply decisions of the household are:
PB,t =
P h  =
Pc,i
A,c,t+i
Ac.t+i'S'f+i
A,c,t
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)
where
(1 -
Pc,t
Pc,t- 1
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
3.3.2 T he Banking Sector
In the model, financial frictions affect real activity via the impact of funds avail­
able to banks and there is no friction in transferring funds between banks and
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nonfinancial firms (see Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki. 
(2011)). Given a certain deposit level a bank can lend frictionlessly to nonfi­
nancial firms against their future profits. In this regard, firms offer to banks a 
perfect state contingent security.
The level of the loans depends on the level of the deposits the net worth 
of the intermediary NWf.  This implies a banking sector’s balance sheet of the 
form:
QtSB,t — NWt +  Dt (3.15)
where St are claims on non-financial firms to finance capital acquired at the end 
of period t for use in period t- \- l  and Qt is the price of a unit of capital so that 
the assets of the bank. Consequently, QtSB,t represents the level of the assets of 
the financial intermediary.
Net worth of the bank accumulates according to the following law of motion:
N W t  =  R k , t Q t - i S B , t - i  ~  R t D t - i  (3.16)
Banks exit with probability 1—6 per period and therefore survive for z—1 periods 
and exit in the zth period with probability (1 — 6)6'^~ .^ Given the fact that bank 
pays dividends only when it exists, the banker’s objective is to maximize expected
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discounted terminal wealth:
O O
Vt = Et -  e^)e‘^ -%,t+iNWt+i+i (3.17)
i=0
subject to an incentive constraint for lenders (households) to be willing to supply 
funds to the banker.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), to motivate an endogenous constraint on the 
bank’s ability to obtain funds, 1 introduce the following simple agency problem. 
1 assume that after a bank obtains funds, the bank’s manager may transfer a 
fraction of assets to her family. In the recognition of this possibility, households 
limit the funds they lend to banks. Moreover 1 assume that the fraction of funds 
that a banker can divert depends on the composition of the bank’s liabilities.
Divertable assets consists of total gross assets QtSB,t- If a bank diverts assets 
for its personal gain, it faces defaults on its debt. The creditors may re-claim 
the remaining fraction 1 — 0  of funds. Because its creditors recognize the bank’s 
incentive to divert funds, they will restrict the amount they lend. In this way a 
borrowing constraint may arise. In order to ensure that bankers do not divert 
funds the following incentive constraint must hold:
Vt > e{QtSB,t) (3.18)
The incentive constraint states that in order for households to be willing to
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supply funds to a bank, the bank’s franchise value Vt must be at least as large 
as the gain from diverting funds. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler 
et al. (2011), to solve the problem 1 guess a linear solution of the form:
V t  = V t { S B , t i  D t )  =  i ^ s , t S B , t  — ^ d , t D t  (3.19)
where and Pd,u are time-varying parameters that are the marginal values of 
the asset at the end of period t. Let be the leverage ratio of a bank that 
satisfy the incentive constraint, from the optimization problem 1 have that:
(3.20)
where (j)^  represents the leverage ratio. This is equal to:
and:
i^ d,t — DtDFt^t+iDt+iRt+1 (3.22)
f^ s,t — DtDFt^t+A+i{Rk,t+i — Rt+i) (3.23)
whereBPt^f+fc =  is the real stochastic discount rate, Qt is the shadow
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value of a unit of net worth and is equal to:
Qt =  1 — cr  ^+  Osiydtt +  =  1 — ctb +  (3.24)
and the term R k , t + i  represents the return on capital defined in the following way:
(3.25)
Oft
where Zt+\ is the marginal product of capital. The term APf represents an asset 
price shock that evolves according to the following process:
where eAp,t is an indepented and indentically normal distribuited process with 
zero mean and standard deviation (Tap-
Evolution of A ggregate N et W orth  At an aggregate level net worth is the 
sum of existing bankers and new bankers:
=  +  (3.26)
Net worth of existing bankers equals earnings on assets held in the previous 
period net cost of deposit finance, multiplied by a fraction 6, the probability
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that they survive until the current period:
NWe,t = 6[Zt +  (1 — 8)Q^Sbd^-i — RtDt-i (3.27)
Since new bankers cannot operate without any net worth, 1 assume that the 
family transfers to each one the fraction ^'®/(l — <j) of the total value assets of 
exiting entrepreneurs. This implies:
NWrtf = f  +  (1 -  (3.28)
Given this the aggregate level of net worth is given by:
NWt = { { e  + i^)[Zt  + ( l -  S)Qt]St,t-i -  R tD t- 1 } BCt (3.29)
where BCt is a shock to bank capital that evolves according to the following 
process:
log ( H )  =  Pbc log ( ^ )  +  enc, (3.30)
where eBc,t is an indepented and indentically normal distribuited process with 
zero mean and standard deviation (Tbc
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3.3.3 N on-financial Firm s
G oods Producers
Competitive good producers operate a constant return to scale technology with 
capital an labour as inputs ;
=  (3.31)
The term At represents a technology shock that follows a process of the form:
l o g ( ^ )  = P „ l o g ( ^ ) + e . 4 , t  (3.32)
where 6a ,t is an indepented and indentically normal distribuited process with 
zero mean and standard deviation a a
The firm’s behavior is summarized by the following standard first order con­
ditions:
P f  (1 -  a)Y P  
P t  K t
(3.33)
=  R t  +  5  (3.34)
The final output is then equal to:
Y t  =  ( l -  c ) Y ^  (3.35)
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where c is a fixed cost of production.
C apital P roducers
Capital producing firms at time t convert R of output into (1 — f[Xt))It  of new 
capital sold at a real price Qt- They then maximize expected discounted profits
D t  ^ 2  D D t , t + k  [ Q t + k { l  —  f  (P+fc/R + k - i ) ) D + k  —  I t+ k ]  (3.36)
fc=0
This results in the first-order condition
=  1 (3.37)
Up to a first order approximation this is the same as
-  /(A t) -  A t/(A t)) +  Pt I I I/,2 _ =  1 (3.38)
1 complete this set-up with the following functional form;
f { X)  =  <l>x It-i
(3.39)
Investm ent Com posites. Cross investment consists of domestic and foreign
final goods:
If. =
1 M/-1 Pr-1M/
_ PI PJ—1
(3.40)
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As for the consumption case, the corresponding Dixit-Stiglitz price indices are
Pl,t = +  (1 -  W j ) ( P F , (3.41)
This delivers the same form of intra-temporal first order conditions:
lH,t = w/ ( It (3.42)
Pp.
Pl,t
Ip,t = (1 -  W / )  ( ] It (3.43)
As before if, I define RERj^t = for investment, then foreign counterparts 
of the above defining demand for the export of the home goods are
P k t V '  _  , (  PH,t V '
- ^ V p i . t R E R i F
where Ph p  Pc,t Pj ^  denote the price of home consumption, aggregate con­
sumption and aggregate investment goods in foreign currency and I have used 
the law of one namely StP^^t — PH,t- Again I define
Pit = +  (1 -  O iP k tY 'A  ^  (3.45)
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The R etail Sector
The retail sector uses a homogeneous wholesale good to produce a basket of 
differentiated goods for consumption
/  p 1 \  C / ( C - i )
Ct =  f y  (3.46)
where C is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations 
for each intermediate good m with price Pt{m) of the form
Ct{m) = I f l ^ )  Ct (3.47)
where Pt = Pt(m)^~^dm  ^ Pt is the aggregate price index.
Now 1 assume that there is a probability of 1 — ^  at each period that the price 
of each retail good m  is set optimally to P®(m). If the price is not re-optimized, 
then it is held f i x e d .F o r  each retail producer m  the objective is at time t to 
choose {P®(m)} to maximize discounted profits
O O
Et y ;  eDFt,tFkYt+k(m) [P“(m) -  Pt+kMCt+k] (3.48)
k=0
subject to (3.47), where DFt,t+k is the nominal stochastic discount factor over
^°Thus we can interpret as the average duration for which prices are left 
unchanged.
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the interval [t, t +  A:]. The solution to this is
EtY,eDFt^t+kYtFk{m)
k=Q
b 'W  -  (1 _  ,^^ ~^ MStPtFkMCt+k =  0 (3.49)
and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
(3.50)
Defining the nominal discount factor by DFt^t^k = and the marginal
p W
costs MCt = -fr,  inflation dynamics are given by
Jt — Ji+i]
ytDc,t
I  1
. 1 - ?
f  I ytDc,tMCt
n,:i = + (1 -0  (A) 1-C
(3.51)
(3.52)
(3.53)
3.3 .4  Central Bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy by adjusting the policy rate accord­
ing to the following Taylor rule:
k g  —  P r  log ^  +  (1 — P r )  (^7T log —îl—ktll 0^  log ^ )  -I- (3.54)
Rn R n n
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where Cr.z+i is a monetary policy shock that is i.i.d. with zero mean and standard 
deviation gm-
The real and the nominal interest rates are linked with the following Fisher 
equation:
Rt = (3.55)
lit
3.3.5 Equilibrium , Foreign A sset A ccum ulation
Equilibrium and Foreign asset accumulation and the central bank behavior is 
given by the following equations.
The national income identity is equal to:
I t  — CH,t +  lH,t H  — [C^,t +  lH,t] +G t = Cn,t +  lH,t +  P A / +  Gt (3.56)
where:
e x ;  .  o r + i ^ d - , : )  / ;
(3.57)
where p are the share of the foreign economy. Current account dynamics are 
given by:
=  S t s y _ ,  +  TBt (3.58)
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where the term TBt represents the trade balance. This is defined as:
T B t — PH,t^t ~  Pc,tCt — Pi^th ~  Piî,tGt (3.59)
The nominal exchange rate:
St RERc,t Ht (3.60)
With local currency pricing the real exchange rate and the terms of trade, defined 
as the domestic currency relative price of import to export % =  are related 
by the relationships:
R E R cj
RERi^t =
-1 l-u*
- 1
w} +  (1 - - 1
1 — wj +  ^ 1—/ i j
(3.61)
(3.62)
Inflation is given by a composite of home and foreing inflation given by the 
following CES function:
(3.63)
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The foreign Euler equation is:
R .n,t
A
(3.64)
Where the nominal interest rate %  ^  and the real interest rate are linked with 
the following Fisher equation:
R ,Tljt—1
w ~
C165)
I close the model with the following autoregressive processes of order one:
log Gt+1
log
G
MSt+i
M S
R .
log
log
log
'n,t— 1
n,%i
n
a t+i
log
C*
I*
log
A:^ +1
A*
1 I
P g  log ~ Q  +
P m s  log +  ^M S,t+ l 
Æ lo g % :^  +  6R,t+1
n:
— Æ log
=  P*c log ^  +  ^*c,t+l 
i:
P*i log ^  +  e*f+i 
A io g ÿ ^  +  4,t+i
(3.66)
(3.67) 
pl68)
(3.69)
(3.70)
(3.71)
(3.72)
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3.4 M acroprudential Policy
Macroprudential policy affects the net worth of existing bankers. As stated 
before, our aim is to study the impact of capital regulation. To this extend I 
assume that banks have to pay a penalty when their leverage ratio deviates from 
a regulatory given target. In such scenario eq. (3.29) can be represented as:
NWt =  {(g +  () \Zt +  (1 -  -  RtD t-i - p e n * f  -  M P,) }BCt
(3.73)
where pen * /  — M P ^  represent the penalty of deviating from a given
macroprudential target^^. This represent the capital requirements that the banks 
face in a form of macroprudential policy. I express MPt as:
MPt =  (1 — Pmp)AIP +  (1 — Pmp) {At — A )  +  pj^pMPt-i (3.74)
I set the steady state level of M P  equal to the steady state level of the leverage 
ratio and the variable Xt equal to the growth rate of output. In this case a 
positive value of Xt corresponds to a countercyclical policy: capital requirements 
increase in good times (banks must hold more capital for a given amount of loans) 
and decrease in recessions. This is in line with the proposed regulatory reform of 
Basel III. Finally, as in the previous case, BCt represents a bank capital shock.
^^The penality is then collected by the government. However, given the non distortionary 
nature of this tax it leaves the remaining of the model unaffected.
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As before, it evolves according to the following process:
log (H) =  P b c  log (3.75)
where epc t^ is an indepented and indentically normal distribuited process with 
zero mean and standard deviation gbc
3.5 Calibration
As far as possible parameters are chosen based on quarterly data for the Philip­
pines. In particular I calibrated the consumption, investment and government 
spending over GDP ratios to mimic the features of the Philippines economy. The 
banking sector is calibrated as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010): <j is set at 0.975 
implying a survival rate of 10 years. ^ and 6 are calibrated to hit an average 
credit spread of 100 basis points and a financial intermediaries leverage ratio of 
4. Elsewhere the parameters reflect broad characteristics of emerging economies 
as in Batini et al. (2007) and Anand et al. (2010). In particular, following 
Anand et al. (2010) we calibrate the shares wc, w/, w^, wJ at 0.8 and, following 
Batini et al. (2007) we calibrate the substitution elasticities at 1.5 and
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/ij, at 0.25. Table 1 provides the full list of the value of the parameters.
Table 1 - C alib ra tion
P a ram e te r Value P aram e te r Value
/3 0.99 2
( 0.73 c 0.1429
a 3 c 7.67
c
Y 0.738 Q 0.17
I
Y 0.203 P i 0.25
G
Y 0.099 P*i 0.25
Pa 0.85 P c 1.5
Pb c 0.9 1.5
Pf b 0.9 4>b 0.05
Pa p 0.9 Pr 0.5
Pr 0.5 P i 0.5
0 . 2 Pi 0.5
6y 0.5 P*I 0.5
a 0.65 Pa 0.5
S 0.069 0.972
viC 0.8 ^B 0.384
w / 0.8 ^B 0.004
*
WQ 0.8 p e n 0.25
w*j 0.8 Pm p 0.5
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3.6 The Role of M acroprudential Policy in R e­
ducing Procyclicality
In order to illustrate the role of macroprudential policy in reducing procyclicality 
I compare the effects of several financial and non-financial shocks of an economy 
without macroprudential policy with an economy that has a set of active policies 
to reduce procyclicality. As stated before, I consider five types of shocks; (i) 
foreign borrowing shock, (ii) bank capital shock, (iii) technology shock, (iv) 
monetary policy shock and (v) asset price.
The main result I obtain is that macroprudential policy in the form of coun­
tercyclical capital regulation is a powerful tool in increasing the resilience of the 
financial system and the economy as a whole. In all the shocks considered, I 
register a decrease in the volatility of the banks’ capital and therefore in the 
leverage ratio. This affects the real economy through the amount of lending 
and consequently the amount of investment. As a consequence, this reduces the 
volatility in the real economy and it may help to prevent the classic boom and 
burst cycle.
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Foreign Borrowing Shock
Figure 2 - Impulse response functions to a postive foreign borrowing shock - The red 
dashed line represents the model without capital regulation and the black line the
model with capital regulation.
Figure 2 shows the effects of a shock on foreign borrowing. As expected, the 
higher foreign borrowing increases the future supply of capital though the in­
vestment channel, which in turn responds to an anticipated future rise in profits 
relative to the cost of funds. The outcome is a higher demand and inflationary 
pressures, together with a boom in credit growth in the economy following the 
capital inflow surge. As a consequence, interest rates rise and the real exchange 
rate appreciates. In the model this mechanism is further amplified since banks 
are allowed to borrow from abroad therefore there is a financial accelerator mech­
anism at play. The effects of countercyclical capital regulation are shown in the 
comparison between the red dashed and the blue line. Since foreign borrowing
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is a component of the banks’ balance sheet the countercyclical policy is effective 
in mitigating the effect of an foreign borrowing shock. The mechanism at play is 
straightforward: an increase in foreign borrowing expands the balance sheet of 
the banking sector and with a consequent increase of the net worth. Since the 
capital regulation is modeled after a penalty on the excessive leverage it works to 
counteract the build up of the intermediary net worth thus reducing the amount 
of lending and therefore the amount of investment.
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Figure 3 - Impulse response functions to a negative bank capital shock - The red 
dashed line represents the model without capital regulation and the black line the
model with capital regulation.
The response to a bank capital shock is shown in figure 3. As before, it clearly 
demonstrates the importance of financial stability to business cycle fluctuations 
as well as the need to account for supply side financial accelerator effects in 
the amplification and propagation of shocks. The initiating disturbance is an
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exogenous decline in capital quality or bank capital shock. What I am trying to 
capture in a simple way is an exogenous force that triggers a decline in the value 
of intermediary assets such a large non-performing asset. Within the model 
economy, the initial exogenous decline is then magnified in two ways. First, 
because banks are leveraged, the effect of a decline in assets values on bank net 
worth is enhanced by a factor equal to the leverage ratio. Second, the drop in net 
worth tightens the banks’ borrowing constraint inducing effectively a fire sale of 
assets that further depresses asset values. The crisis then feeds into real activity 
as the decline in asset values leads to a fall in investment and output.
That transmission mechanism at work during a financial crisis is reflected in 
the behavior of the spread between the expected return to capital and the riskless 
interest rate. With financial frictions, the spread rises on impact as a product of 
the decline in bank net worth. The increase in the cost of capital is responsible for 
the magnified drop in investment and output. Financial factors also contribute 
to the slow recovery back to trend. To reduce the spread between the expected 
return to capital and the riskless rate, bank net worth must increase. So long as 
the spread is above trend, financial factors are a drag on the real economy. Note 
that throughout this convergence process, banks are effectively deleveraging since 
they are building up equity relative to debt. In this way, the model captures 
how the deleveraging process can slow down a recovery.
3. Capital Flows, Financial Interm ediation and M acroprudential
Policies 133
T e c h n o lo g y  S h o c k
V Investm ent : 10'^  E x ch a n g e  R a te
10 15 20  25  30
Q u arte rs  
In terest R a te
10 15 20  25  30
Q u ar te rs
10 15 20  25  30
Q u arte rs  
A s s e t  P r ic e s
10 15 20  25  30C^artere 5 10 15 20  25  30Queers .
. -jo'^ F ore ign  Borrowing
10 15 20  25  30
^ Q u a r t e r s  
B a n k  Capita l
fi I 11
/  ; .s 0
 ^ 1
10 15 20  25  30
Q u arte rs
5 10 15 20 25  30
Figure 4 - Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock - The red 
dashed line represents the model without capital regulation and the black line the
model with capital regulation.
Figure 4 shows the result of a technology shock. The dynamics of the econ­
omy are similar in response to a foreign borrowing shock, except for inflation 
which initially falls in response to greater productivity gains. Thus interest rates 
can be lowered, resulting in a real exchange rate depreciation. Importantly, in 
both cases a macroprudential or countercyclical capital regulation lowers busi­
ness cycle fluctuations. However, in the case of a technology shock the capital 
regulation works against the monetary stance, generating a trade-off between 
macroeconomic and financial stability objectives.
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Figure 5 - Impulse response function to a monetary policy tightening - The red 
dashed line represents the model without capital regulation and the black line the
model with capital regulation.
In figure 5 I highlight the impact of monetary tightening. The effect on aggre­
gate demand and inflation will be more moderate with countercyclical capital 
regulation. A contractionary monetary policy shock reduces asset prices and 
raises the spread, and thus reduces investment. The lower economic activity 
reduces inflation and bank profitability. Macroprudential policies will again help 
reduce procyclicality of the financial system and moderate the fall in investment 
and inflation.
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Figure 6 - Impulse response function to an asset price shock - The red dashed line 
represents the model without capital regulation and the black line the model with
capital regulation.
Finally figure 6 shows the effects of a positive asset price shock. I notice that 
such shock generates a similar impulse response to a technology shock, except 
that inflation increases in the absence of technology gains necessitating interest 
rate hikes. This leads to a short-term exchange rate appreciation as expected and 
classic symptoms of macroeconomic overheating. Also in this case, the capital 
control policy is an effective tool in reducing the volatility of the economy.
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3.7 M acroprudential and M onetary Policy In­
teractions
The interaction of monetary policy with macroprudential policies suggests scope 
to minimize macrofinancial instability by combining a modified Taylor rule with 
a macroprudential overlay. In this section I study how macroprudential policy 
in the form of countercyclical capital regulation interacts with monetary policy.
In order to assess the importance of such interactions, I consider four different 
policy scenarios. In the first scenario I employ a standard Taylor rule as described 
in eq. (3.54). In the second one I modify the Taylor-rule to incorporate a weight 
on credit g row th .T h is  is the same approach used by Christiano et al. (2010), 
and Curdia and Woodford (2010). In this scenario I want to analyse whether a 
modified Taylor rule can reduce the welfare loss and hence stabilize the economy. 
The third scenario aims at showing the importance of macroprudential policy 
and, to this extent, I introduce the macroprudential framework in the analysis 
and I use the standard Taylor rule. In the fourth and last scenario I employ the 
augmented Taylor rule in the macroprudential policy framework. I consider this 
last case as the reference scenario. Table 2 shows the weights used in the welfare 
evaluation exercise.
12 Following Unsal (2011) we set the Taylor rule coefficient for credit growth at 0.5.
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T a b le  2 - P a r a m e te r s o f  t h e  P o lic y  R u le
Lag in te re s t ra te In fla tion  R ate O u tp u t G ap C red it G row th
Taylor Rule 0.5 2.0 0.5
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th 0.5 2.0 0.5 0.5
To compute the welfare loss in terms of consumption equivalence I employ the 
methodology as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and I calculate the welfare 
loss using a second order approximation of the utility function. This represents 
the fraction of consumption (in percentage terms) that is required to equate 
welfare under a given policy rule to the one given by the reference scenario in 
the face of a one percent given shock.^^ Following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and 
Unsal (2011) I start by expressing the household utility function in a recursive 
form:
14 =  U (Q ,T , ) +  / ) % !  (3.76)
Then I take a second order approximation of this function at the steady state. 
Using the second order solution of the model I calculate the value of Vt for 
each case. The comparison is made in terms of a consumption equivalent, given 
by the fraction of consumption required to equate welfare under a given policy 
to the welfare under the augmented Taylor rule in the macroprudential policy 
framework. The result is a measure of the welfare loss in units of steady state
^^See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Faia and Monacelli (2007) for a detailed discus­
sion of the methodology.
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consumption. A higher value of welfare loss indicates that the policy is less 
desirable.
In my analysis, unlike Gertler and Karadi (2011) who consider the welfare loss 
under a single shock (the capital quality shock) and Unsal (2011) who consider 
only two shocks (technology and a financial shock), I take into account several 
shocks, namely: (i) borrowing shock, (ii) bank capital shock, (iii) technology 
shock and (iv) asset price shock.
Table 3 shows the computed welfare losses and the interest rate volatility. 
The first result that the table highlights is that the augmented Taylor rule in the 
macroprudential policy framework is the more effective since the welfare loss is 
positive in all the cases.
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Table 3 - P erfo rm ance of D ifferent Taylor Rules
W elfare Loss <^ R
F o re ig n  B o r ro w in g  S h o c k
Taylor Rule 0.352 1.43
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th 0.268 1.40
Taylor R ule and M acrop ruden tia l Policy 0.082 1.03
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th and M acrop ruden tia l Policy - 1
B a n k  C a p i ta l  S h o c k
Taylor Rule 0.434 1.55
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th 0.310 1.51
Taylor R ule and M acrop ruden tia l Policy 0.104 1.06
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th and  M acrop ruden tia l Policy - 1
T e c h n o lo g y  S h o c k
Taylor R ule 0.268 1.35
Taylor R ule w ith C red it G row th 0.224 1.33
Taylor R ule and M acrop ruden tia l Policy 0.072 1.02
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th and  M acrop ruden tia l Policy - 1
A s s e t  P r ic e  S h o c k
Taylor Rule 0.396 1.51
T aylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th 0.274 1.48
Taylor R ule and M acrop ruden tia l Policy 0.094 1.04
Taylor R ule w ith  C red it G row th  and  M acrop ruden tia l Policy - 1
A second important result is that the welfare loss is higher when financial 
shocks hit the economy. In particular, the bank capital shock produces the 
highest welfare loss followed by the asset price shock. In turns, macroprudential 
policy and, more in general, a stabilizing policy produces the best results for 
these shocks. For the bank capital shock the difference between the standard 
Taylor rule scenario and the scenario with an augmented Taylor rule in the 
macroprudential policy framework is 0.434. Similarly, for the asset price shock, 
the difference is 0.396. The difference is quite relevant for the foreign borrowing 
and the technology shock aswell but it is not so marked. Furthermore, the results
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suggest that macroprudential policy has a stronger impact than the Taylor rule 
augmented with credit growth. This can be seen in the welfare loss difference 
when macroprudential policy is introduced. In the bank shock case, the welfare 
loss difference between the case of an augmented Taylor rule and a standard 
Taylor rule in a macroprudential policy framework is 0.206. Similarly in the asset 
price shock case is 0.18. This implies that, if a central bank wants to mitigate the 
impact of negative financial shocks, a macroprudential policy is more effective 
than targeting financial variables in the Taylor rule. Overall, the results suggest 
that financial stabilization and in particular, macroprudential measures in the 
form of capital requirement, play a crucial role in the stabilization policy and 
especially in the stabilization of financial shocks.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter develops an open economy DSGE model with an optimizing banking 
sector to assess the role of capital flows, macrofinancial linkages, and macropru­
dential policies. The key result is that macroprudential measures can usefully 
complement monetary policy in response to most types of exogenous shocks. 
Countercyclical macroprudential polices can help reduce macroeconomic volatil­
ity and enhance welfare in combination with a modified Taylor rule that also 
places a weight on credit developments. However, the gains from countercyclical 
macroprudential policies are lower with technology shocks and generally result
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in lower medium term output. Thus, there is a potential trade-off of using coun­
tercyclical capital requirement as proposed in Basel 111 for emerging markets, 
requiring a judicial use of macroprudential policies tailored to country circum­
stances. The results also demonstrate the importance of capital flows and fi­
nancial stability for business cycle fluctuations as well as supply-side financial 
accelerator effects in the amplification and propagation of shocks in an emerging 
Asian economy.
Asset prices and banking lending are the key channels of transmission of capi­
tal flows in the Philippines. The large capital inflows received by emerging Asian 
countries like Philippines can result in macroeconomic overheating pressures such 
as higher inflation and real exchange rate appreciation as well as financial sta­
bility risks as capital inflows fuel rapid asset price inflation and credit growth. 
The results of the DSGE model suggest that the best response to financial and 
foreign shocks would be to implement countercyclical macroprudential polices as 
they help reducing macroeconomic volatility and procyclicality of the financial 
system in combination with a modified Taylor rule that places some weight on 
credit growth. This seems a more attractive option than contemplating direct 
measures to control capital inflows and large-scale foreign exchange interventions 
that have been shown to be suboptimal even in models without optimizing bank­
ing sectors (see Unsal 2011 and Berg et al. 2011), although this chapter does 
not consider those policies and leaves that for future research.
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Financial instability or shocks to bank capital triggered by a large non- 
performing loan, for example, has a pervasive and significant impact on the 
real economy through macrofinancial linkages. The model sheds light on the 
key transmission mechanism of a financial crisis by showing how bank leverage 
amplifies the initial shock to capital and tightens the banks’ borrowing con­
straint inducing effectively a fire sale of assets. The crisis then feeds into real 
activity as the decline in asset values is responsible for the magnified drop in 
investment and output. In this way the model captures how the deleveraging 
process can slow down a recovery as observed in the global financial crisis and 
Asian financial crisis. This transmission mechanism also highlights the impor­
tance of maintaining an adequate bank capital buffer, avoiding a rapid growth in 
credit that often leads to rash of non-performing loans, and role of asset prices 
in amplifying business cycles. Here again, macroprudential policies could help 
minimize macrofinancial instability by combining a modified Taylor rule with a 
countercyclical capital requirement.
In the near future I am planning to consider how the results are affected by 
changing the values of some key parameters. Given the nature of the chapter, 
the parameters of the Taylor rule or the parameters that regulate the macro­
prudential policy are the natural candidates. This would assess further how 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy interact.
Chapter 4
Aggregate Stability and 
Balanced-Budget Rules
A recurring debate in American politics regards the possibility of inserting in 
the US constitution the requirements that federal government operates under a 
balanced budget rule (BBR). Indeed, most states have constitutional or statu­
tory limitations restricting their ability to run deficits in the state’s general 
fund. Balanced-budget limitations may be either prospective (beginning-of-the- 
year) requirements or retrospective (end-of-the-year) requirements. The Euro­
pean Union, after the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and Italy, is introducing the 
so called ‘Fiscal Compact’. This pact requires that the government budgets shall 
be balanced or in surplus, with a maximum level of annual structural deficit of
0.5% of GDP.
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In the economic literature there is no shortage of discussion on the BBR. Both 
traditional business cycle literature (see among others Lucas and Stokey, 1983, 
King et ah, 1988, Eggertsson 2008) and political economy literature (see among 
others Alesina and Perotti 1996; Besley and Smart 2007; Azzimonti et al. 2010) 
study under different perspectives the normative properties of adopting a BBR. 
A different strand of literature focuses on the stabilising properties of a BBR on 
equilibrium determinacy. The main contribution to this can be found in Schmitt- 
Grohe and Uribe (1997). The authors find that in a standard neoclassical growth 
model with indivisible labour isomorphic to Hansen (1985) or King et al. (1988), 
imposing on the fiscal authority a balanced-budget requirement may induce self- 
fulfilling expectations, hence indeterminacy.
This chapter extends Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s model by considering a more 
general class of production functions, namely the constant elasticity of substi­
tution (CES) production functions as in Arrow et al. (1961), which nest the 
traditional Cobb-Douglas (CD) as a particular case. I justify the introduction 
of this production technology into an otherwise basic real business cycle work­
horse model in two ways. Firstly, from a purely theoretical point of view, by 
simply varying a single model’s parameter, namely the elasticity of substitution 
between production factors, the CES can be used to treat the production inputs,
i.e. labour and capital, both as gross complements (elasticity of substitution be­
low one) or gross substitutes (elasticity of substitution above one). Secondly,
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from an empirical point of view, recent studies, i.e. Antràs (2004), Klump et al. 
(2007, 2012), Leôn-Ledesma et al. (2010a), reject the CD specification in favour 
of CES production function in which labour and capital are gross complements.
I obtain two sets of results. First, I show analytically that the degree of 
substitutability between production factors is a key ingredient to understand 
the (de)stabilising properties of a BBR. Second, when I parametrise the model 
consistently with the empirical evidence, i.e. elasticity of substitution below 
unity, the instability problems that affect the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe model 
are greatly reduced. Nevertheless, for parameter values at the high end of these 
estimates, sunspot equilibria are still possible for the US, the EU and the UK.
The main intuition behind this result goes as follows. When the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is below unity, production factors are 
gross complements. This causes labour hours to be more tightly coupled to the 
stock of capital. Consequently, equilibrium hours worked can respond less freely 
to belief shocks, reducing the possibility of generating the type of endogenous 
fluctuations which characterise the CD case.
The results presented in this chapter link to the existing literature in several 
ways. Firstly, our chapter is closely related to Guo and Lansing (2009). Guo 
and Lansing also use a normalised CES production function and analyse numer­
ically the effect of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor for 
indeterminacy. In their model, a discrete-time version of a modified Benhabib
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and Farmer’s (1994) indeterminate one-sector RBC model under laissez-faire, 
the possibility of indeterminacy derives from increasing returns to scale due to 
a production externality. In the present chapter, it derives from the fiscal in­
creasing returns property of a proportional income tax that is used to balance 
the government’s budget each period, such that a larger economy coincides with 
a lower tax rate. Both papers find that decreasing the elasticity of substitution 
decreases the possibility of indeterminacy. With respect to Guo and Lansing, 
the originality of our theoretical contribution stands in explicitly deriving the 
analytical conditions of how the elasticity of substitution affects the indetermi­
nacy of the model and to apply these conditions to a well defined fiscal policy 
problem.
Secondly, it links to the literature on the stabilising properties of a BBR. 
Giannitsarou (2007), using a discrete time version of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(1997) model, focuses on the stabilising role of consumption taxation. Using 
the same framework, Lirmemarm (2008) argues that the stability properties of 
a BBR may improve sensibly when a class of non-separable utility functions are 
considered. In a similar fashion, Stockman (2010) derives theoretical conditions 
to obtain chaotic equilibria under a BBR.
From this, the goal of the chapter is twofold. First, it derives the analytical 
conditions of how the elasticity of substitution affects the stability of a widely 
used theoretical model. Second, it aims to develop an interest in the use of CES
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production technology in the analysis of economic policy issues.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model 
with only labour tax and the determinacy analysis. Section 3 adds capital taxa­
tion to the benchmark model and discusses the policy implications of introducing 
a BBR in the US, EU and UK. Section 4 concludes.
4.1 The M odel
In this section I derive analytically the main results of the chapter. In order to 
do this I analyse a continuous-time one sector real business cycle model which 
consists of households, firms and government. Government purchases are con­
stant and the only source of government revenues is a labour income tax. The 
initial stock of public debt is zero and the government is subject to a balanced- 
budget requirement. The government budget constraint is given hy G = 
where G indicates government purchases of goods, denotes labour tax rate, 
Wt the pretax wage, and Ht hours worked. Firms hire labour and rent capital in 
a perfectly competitive manner. I generalise the standard CD production func­
tion by employing a normalised version of the CES production function. This 
represents the only difference between the model presented here and the one in 
Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997).
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical infinitely-lived 
households. Each household starts in period 0 with a positive stock of capi­
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tal, K q and chooses path for consumption, Q , hours and capital, so to maximise 
the present value of its lifetime utility. The disutility of labour is linear. In 
mathematical terms, each household solves:
POO
max / (log Q  — AHt) dt (4.1)
Vo
subject to At > 0 and to the standard budget constraint:
Â4 =  {fi-t — Ô) Kt + {1 — T^)wtHt — Ct (4.2)
where p G (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, A G [0, + o o ) is a standard 
utility parameter, denotes the rental rate of capital, 5 G (0,1) is the depre­
ciation rate. A dot above a variable denotes the time derivative, so Kt is net 
investment. The first order conditions associated with this problem are:
ACt =  (1 — 7'^)wt (4.3)
= p)^t (4.4)
The first equation states that the slope of the indifference curve of the repre­
sentative household equates to the slope of the after tax real wage. The second 
equation is the consumption Euler equation. Alongside those I have the following
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transversality condition:
lim e -" * ^  =  0 (4.5)
t ^ o o  C t
The representative firm produces output Yt, hires labour at a rate wt and rents 
capital at a rate according to a CES production function of the type:^
Yf. = B -h (1 - -a )  (4.6)
where a  G (0,1). Note that when cr =  1 the CES collapses to the CD case, 
when <j —> 0 it collapses to the Leontief case where capital and labour are 
perfect complements, while when a  —> oo, capital and labour become perfect 
substitutes.
The representative firm maximises the stream of profit:
poo
max / {Yt — WtHt -  /^ l^ ) dt (4.7)
Jo
subject to the production function as defined in eq. (4.6). Then, the first order 
conditions for this problem are:
Fn,t = wt = { l -  a)B  ( ) (4.8)
^Due to the porpuse of this chapter, the production function does not have any technological 
progress.
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and
FK,t =  /it =  aR  ( (4.9)
Where Fh and Fk  denote the first derivatives of the production function with 
respect to labour and capital respectively. These two equations state that the 
marginal products of the production inputs equate to their corresponding prices. 
Following Klump and de LaGrandville (2000) and Guo and Lansing (2009), I 
“normalise” the standard CES production function so that all steady-state al­
locations and factor income shares are held constant as the input substitution 
elasticity is changed. Normalisation removes the problem that arises from the 
fact that labour and capital are measured in different units, see Klump and 
Marianne (2008). Under CD, normalisation plays no role since, due to its multi­
plicative form, differences in units are absorbed by the scaling constant. The CES 
function, by contrast, is highly non-linear, and so, unless correctly normalised, 
out of its two key parameters - the distribution parameter a  and the substitution 
elasticity a - only the latter is deep. The former turns out to be affected by the 
size of the substitution elasticity and factor income shares. Accordingly, if one is 
interested in model sensitivity with respect to production parameters (as here), 
normalisation is essential to have interpretable comparisons. Given the aim of 
the chapter I normalise the CES with a CD production function.^
In order to complete the description of the model I need to define the aggre-
'We refer the reader to the Appendix for an outline of the normalisation procedure.
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gate resource constraint for the economy as:
Yt = Ct G Kt +  dKt (4.10)
Steady S tate
The adopted normalisation implies that our model shares the same steady state 
as Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997). Given that the wage rate is equal to the 
marginal product of labor, the level of government purchases can be espressed
as:
G = {  —  ] tK  (4.11)
where Sh = {1 — on) is the labour share of output and Si = is the investment 
share in output. Given the distortive nature of fiscal policy, in the steady state 
there is a Laffer curve-type of relation between tax rates and tax revenues. From 
the steady state relations of the endogenous variables, it is easy to show that 
government revenues are zero when tax rates are either zero or one and positive 
in between. Provided that government revenues are a continuous function of the 
tax rate, there must be a that maximises G. In turn can be found as the 
solution of ^  =  0 as:
^ ( l - 5 ) ( T ' * ) ^ - 2 ( l - a ^ ) r ' ‘+ ( i - a ^ )  ^
T-h ( 1  _  _  T'» ( 1  -  a )  -
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where â  is the income share of capital (i.e. the usual CD parameter) obtained 
via the normalisation procedure and ^  is independent of r^. Note that for 
G (0,1), G and the denominator are always positive.^ So t *^ corresponds 
with the zeros of the polynomial:
(1 -  a) -  2 ( i  -  a ^ )  T " + ( i - a ^ )  (4.12)
When = 0 the above expression takes the value of 1 — >  0, while
when =  1 it takes the value of â  — 1^ < 0. Hence one of the zeros 
happens when G (0 ,1 ) and the other when > 1. Therefore there is a 
unique maximum of government revenues, between 0 and 1.
Determ inacy Analysis
1 log-linearise the structural equations around a normalised steady state. As 
previously discussed, 1 follow the normalisation procedure presented by Guo and 
Lansing (2009). This allows us to use the CD production function as a steady 
state benchmark. After some straightforward manipulations 1 can rewrite the 
model as one involving just two dynamic variables, namely consumption and 
capital accumulation (see Appendix B for details of the log-linearisation). The
^To see why the denominator is positive, note that 1— (1 — o;)— > 1—(1 — 
The latter can be written as â  ^1 — which is positive.
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model can be represented as:
Ct
kt
- is+p) - i s + p ) i { i + » ^ )
(1 -  a) -  §  f a  -  5
Ct
kt
.13)
where a lower case variable identifies its log-linearised value and a variable with­
out time index identifies its steady state value. Let J  be the matrix of this hnear 
system. Since (4.13) contains one predetermined, kt  ^and one non-predetermined 
variable, c^ , the perfect-foresight equilibrium will be locally determinate if, and 
only if, the two eigenvalues of J  have different signs. Since the determinant of J  
is the product of its eigenvalues, the system is determinate if and only if the de­
terminant of J  is negative. However, if the determinant is positive and the trace 
(which is the sum of the eigenvalues of J) is negative, i.e. both eigenvalues of J  
are negative, the perfect-foresight equilibrium will be indeterminate. Finally, if 
both the determinant and the trace of J  are positive, i.e. both eigenvalues of J  
are positive, the perfect-foresight equilibrium will be unstable. The determinant 
and trace of J  are respectively:
Det ( J) = 5 [ p  +  5)  (1 — a )  
JTp i^'^  -  ")
a T  -{- I 1 — Of
S + p j  \  5 + p
(4.14)
Trace (J) =  (/^  +  ^) (1 -  -  ( ,  +  3) ( (1 -  r-») (1 -  «)) _  ^
a —
The next two propositions describe the possible equilibrium outcomes.
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P roposition  1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium determinacy 
are:
i f  a e [â, +oo) G [0, min ) or e  (max , 1]
else a G [0, a) = >  G [0, f f i *)
Proof. See Appendix C. ■
P roposition  2 Define e =  • The following four cases fully cate­
gorise all the model outcomes:
a) I f  a e , 1 H—  -------  and — < the model is indeterminate i f f f i  G f —
p J cr Vcr
and determinate iff f i  ^ .
0 ,1 H  ----- — and — > r^*, the model is unstable if f f i  G 1^^
and determinate ifffi  ^ ^ r^ * ,m in  .
c) / /  cr G ^1 H  ------- — , + o o ^  and e >  r^*, the model is indeterminate i f f f i  G
and determinate ifffi  ^ .
d) I f  a E -j—  -----—, +oo^ and £ < ffi*, the model is indeterminate i f f f i  G
and unstable iff f i  G (e , and determinate ifffi  ^ .
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Proposition 1 and 2 state the main result of the chapter. Under a BBR, 
the elasticity of substitution between production factors changes markedly the 
determinacy properties of the model. A few points are noteworthy here. First, 
is not a function of <j. This is a direct consequence of the normalisation 
procedure, i.e. at steady state the Laffer curve is independent of a. Second, the 
threshold tax rate which may cause model’s instability is not only a function, as 
in Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997), of the steady state share of capital to output 
d, but also and in a non-trivial way of the elasticity of substitution between input 
factors ( J .  When the complementarity between factors increases, i.e. when a is 
smaller, the possibility of determinacy when the model is on the upper slope 
of the Laffer curve increases, while the opposite is true when <r gets bigger.'  ^
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that for particularly low values of (j, i.e. 
when ^ > T^, the model is determinate for any < ffi*.
Proposition 2 classifies the equilibrium outcomes when the model displays 
some sort of sunspot fiuctuations, i.e. either stationary or not. Unlike the CD 
specification I am able to induce instability in the system when the labour income 
tax is the only source of government revenue.
^Note that our results perfectly nest Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997) when a  =  1.
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Intuitions: a Closer Look at th e  Labour M arket and the  
Laffer Curve
The equilibrium conditions obtained can be explained by the interactions be­
tween the shape of the Laffer curve and the effect of cr on the "equilibrium 
labour demand schedule" (LDS henceforth). As in the Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe 
model, our LDS may slope upwards since increases in aggregate hours worked 
are accompanied by decreases in the tax rate. As I describe in detail later, this 
is the central mechanism that generates indeterminacy in the model.^ In our 
framework, the elasticity of substitution between factors greatly modifies the 
LDS slope, in turn affecting markedly the equilibrium outcomes. To see why, 
let us write the after-tax labour demand function (in log deviation from steady 
state) as:
where Wt = Wt — denotes the log deviation of the after-tax wage rate from
the steady state. Note that if ^ the slope of the LDS is negative while 
it is positive in the opposite case, i.e. if > ^. It is worth stressing that the 
elasticity of substitution parameter implies that the higher the complementarity 
(substitutability) between production factors, the higher (lower) is the steady 
state tax rate threshold that flips the sign of the LDS slope.
^Interestingly, the same mechanism generates indeterminacy in the one-sector growth model 
with increasing returns to scale analysed in Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
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According to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, indeterminacy occurs when 
jointly the LDS slopes upwards and < ffi*, i.e. we stand on the increasing 
side of the Laffer curve. The intuition behind this goes as follows: let us assume 
that the economy is on the increasing side of the Laffer curve and the LDS slopes 
upwards. In this scenario, when agents expect higher tax rates in the future, for 
a given level of capital stock, hours worked and therefore the rental rate of capital 
will be lower. This is because the marginal product of capital is decreasing in the 
capital/labour ratio. In turn, since consumers want to invest less in the future, 
there is a decrease in current aggregate employment and a decline in output. 
Given that we are on the increasing side of the Laffer curve, the government 
is obliged, following a BBR, to increase taxes today. Hence, expectations of 
higher taxes in the future lead to higher taxes today thus generating self-fulfilling 
prophecies.
As a decreases below unity, production factors become gross complements. 
This causes the demand of labour to be more tightly coupled to the stock of 
capital, which is predetermined. Consequently, hours worked can respond less 
freely to belief shocks. In other words, when a is ‘low’, the LDS is likely to 
slope downward, inducing current aggregate employment to increase when agents 
expect higher taxes. This leads to lower taxes today (the economy is on the 
increasing side of the Laffer curve) thus making endogenous fluctuations more 
difficult to occur. In the case where cr < ë, determinacy results for any < ffi*.
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These effects are reversed when production factors are gross substitutes, i.e.
(J >  1.
Furthermore, when the model is not determinate, the LDS slopes upwards 
and < ffi*, sunspot fluctuations are stationary. This is because an increase in 
current taxation generates a further decrease in the equilibrium hours worked. 
This decrease pushes flscal policy to implement a further increase in current 
taxation. As a result, for a given expected increase in the future tax rate, the 
tax rate in period 0 is larger in absolute value than the tax rate in period if for 
any f  > 0. Hence, the sequence of tax rates converges to the steady state, i.e. 
indeterminacy.
When the steady state tax rate is greater than r^*, i.e. on the decreasing 
side of the Laffer curve, a positive slope in the LDS is a necessary condition for 
determinacy. This is because while expectations of higher future tax rates gener­
ate a decrease in current aggregate employment, flscal policy needs to cut taxes 
in order raise revenues and therefore to balance its budget, in turn contrasting 
the initial expectations of higher taxes.
I am also able to induce instability in the model with only labour income tax. 
This occurs whenever LDS slopes downwards and we stand on the decreasing 
side of the Laffer curve. The intuition behind this result is the following. Let us 
consider the case where complementarity between factors is so strong that ^ > 
T^ *, and agents expect higher future taxes. A negative LDS slope implies that
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equilibrium hours worked increase. Since the system is now on the decreasing 
side of the Laffer curve, the government needs to raise taxation (to decrease 
government revenues) in order to balance its budget. While higher taxation 
today helps to self-fulfill agents’ expectations, it decreases current labour demand 
putting a slight downward pressure on taxes. As a result, (for a given expected 
increase in the future tax rate) tax rates in period 0 increase less in absolute 
value than tax rates in period t' for any f  > 0. Hence, the sequence of tax rates 
has an explosive path, i.e. instability.
Finally, note that I can induce instability even when production factors are 
gross substitute and the tax rate is smaller than the peak of the Laffer curve. 
This is possibly due to the perverse effect of the high degree of substitutability 
and the positive LDS slope. However, given that, as discussed below, this occurs 
for empirically implausible® values of <j , this result goes beyond the aim of the 
present exercise. Hence I leave future research to explore this conjecture in more 
detail.
A  N um erical Exam ple
In order to show how the elasticity of substitution changes quantitatively the 
determinacy analysis, I present a numerical example. The model is calibrated 
to annual frequency. The parameter values, with the obvious exception of cr, are
®With a standard parametrisation 1 +  =  2.75. This value is outside plausible esti­
mates of a .
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the same as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and are p =  0.04 for the annual 
interest rate, 5 =  0.1 for the capital depreciation rate, the utility parameter A  is 
calibrated to 1 and the CD capital income share in output is d =  0.3.
In order to have a comprehensive picture of how the elasticity parameter 
modifies the (de)stabilising properties of a BBR, I allow a to vary between 0.2 
and 1.8. These values are extreme from an empirical point of view but useful to 
give a graphical representation of the theoretical results.^
D 0.2 0.4 Q.B 0
Labour-lncome Tax
0.2 0,4 0.6 0.8
Labour-lncome Tax
0.2 0.4 0.6
Labour-lncomeTax
Figure 1 - Determinacy analysis with labour tax only. W hite area, determinacy.
Grey area, indeterminacy. Black area, instability.
Results of this exercise are presented in Figiue (1). Each subplot presents the 
values of labour tax rates that induce determinacy (white area), indeterminacy 
(grey area) and instability (black area). As discussed in detail before, reducing
^We refer the reader to section 3 for a detailed discussion on the empirical estimates of a .
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the value of a reduces the indeterminacy area, in turn expanding the possibility 
that for a given tax rate, a BBR dehvers determinacy. Finally, when ü/cr > 
a BBR may induce instability for steady state labour tax rates greater than the 
peak of the Laffer curve (bottom right subplot).
4.2 Policy Analysis
In this section I examine the empirical relevance of combining a CES production 
function with a BBR. After introducing capital taxes, I discuss how I define a 
range of reasonable values for the elasticity of substitution parameter for the 
US, the EU and the UK and, finally, I show that the likelihood of being in a 
indeterminate area is sensibly reduced.
A dding C apital Taxes
In this section I extend the basic result to a case where capital income taxation 
is an additional source of government revenue.^ In this case, government budget 
constraint takes the form:
G  =  T lw tH t  +  ( f H - S ) T ' l K t  (4.17)
® Given the aim of the paper we ignore consumption taxes which are a significant source of 
revenues in the European countries. See Giannitsrou (2007) for a detailed discussion on this 
theme.
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where is the tax rate and the term —r^ôKt represents the depreciation al­
lowance. In this analysis I consider the case where government purchases are 
fixed and and vary in the same proportion to balance the budget, i.e.
fh _  -k f
0 2  0.4 0 6 0 2 0 4 0 6 0 2  0.4 0 6 0 8
Figure 2 - Determinacy analysis with labour and capital taxes. W hite area, 
determinacy. Grey area, indeterminacy. Black area, instability. The pairs (r^,T^) for 
which (the solid line) correspond to the case of an income tax regime with
depreciation allowance.
The determinacy analysis is represented in Figure 2. To be consistent with 
the labour income tax case, I let the elasticity of substitution parameter a vary 
between 0.2 and 1.8. The solid line represents the points where and it
^The assumption that capital and labor tax rates vary in the same proportion to balance
the
budget may be considered ad hoc and rather arbitrary. We present this in order to make 
our results easily comparable with Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997) and Giannistorou (2007).
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corresponds to the case of an income tax regime with depreciation allowance. As 
before, each subplot presents the values of labour and capital tax rates that in­
duce determinacy (white area), indeterminacy (grey area) and instability (black 
area). The central graph represents the CD case discussed by Schmitt-Grohè 
and Uribe (1997), i.e. a = 1. Note that if T* =  0, the model collapses to the 
one analysed in the previous section. As in Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997), 
Guo and Harrison (2004) and Giannitsarou (2007), the presence of an endoge­
nous labour tax rate is the key destabilising ingredient of the model. If labour 
taxes are endogenous, as the steady state capital tax rate increases, the range of 
indeterminacy with respect to labour taxes becomes larger.
However, as described in detail above, decreasing (increasing) the elasticity 
of substitution between factors decreases (increases) the potential destabilising 
effects of an endogenous labour tax rate, in turn decreasing the possibility of 
indeterminacy for a given mix of capital-labour taxation.
A n em pirical perspective on th e  elasticity  o f su bstitu tion
As I discuss above, cr is a key parameter to understand the determinacy prop­
erties of the model. Therefore, in order to conduct a realistic policy analysis, it
°^For extremely strong factor complementarity, i.e. a  =  0.2, the system may display insta­
bility when labour income taxation is on the decreasing side of the Laffer curve and the capital 
income tax rate is sufficiently ‘low’. Given its empirical implausibility, we do not analyse this 
result further and we refer to the previous section for an explanation of the case without capital 
taxation.
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is crucial to calibrate the elasticity of substitution between production factors 
consistently with the empirical evidence. In what follows I provide a brief liter­
ature review of the efforts made and the difficulties found in estimating this key 
parameter. Based on this survey, I conclude with a typical range of values for 
the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital for the US, the EU and 
the UK. Then, I use these values in the calibration exercise.
Despite the huge efforts devoted to its estimation, limited consensus has 
emerged on the value of the substitution elasticity. This doubtless reflects 
many practical data problems (e.g., outliers, uncertain autocorrelation, struc­
tural breaks, quality improvements, measurement errors, etc.) as well as a priori 
modeling choices and the performance of various estimators. For example, de­
pending on the methodology employed, the existing literature finds values that 
are both well below and near the unity. Early studies based on cross sectional 
analysis generally find an elasticity of substitution close to one, i.e. they could 
not reject a CD production function, see, inter alia, Fuchs (1963), Zarembka 
(1970) and Dhrymes and Zarembka (1970). Differently, estimates based on time 
series typically find an elasticity of substitution significantly lower than one, 
implying gross complementarity between production factors, e.g. Lucas (1969) 
provides a value of a in the range 0.3 to 0.5, Coen (1969) finds that the best fit 
occurs when a  =  0.2 and Maddala (1965) estimates values for a between 0.1 and 
0.2. Furthermore, estimates of cr based on the marginal productivity of capital
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tend to be lower than those based on the marginal productivity of labour, i.e. 
Dhrymes and Zarembka (1970).
In an influential contribution, Berndt (1976) attempts to reconcile these 
views. He constructs a high quality time series data for the US for the period 
1929-1968 and estimates a via a time series two-stages least squares procedure. 
Using a variety of functional forms and assuming Hicks-neutral technological 
change, Berndt finds an elasticity of substitution close to one. Antras (2004) ex­
tends Berndt’s analysis by allowing for a more general specification of the aggre­
gate technological progress. Firstly, he suggests that the Berndt assumption of 
Hicks-neutral technical progress, coupled with relatively stable factor shares and 
growing capital-labor ratio, biases the results towards a CD.^  ^ In other words, 
the assumption of Hicks-neutral technology necessarily biases the estimates of 
a towards one. Secondly, by allowing for biased technology progress, i.e. tech­
nology change is allowed to affect the ratio of marginal products of labour and 
capital, Antras finds estimates of a significantly lower than one. He identifies as 
a typical range for the US of a to be between 0.6 and 0.9 and also acknowledges 
the possibility for the elasticity of substitution to be lower than 0.5.
A recent growing literature builds on the time series approach proposed by 
Antras that allows for biased technological progress and applies to the CES pro­
duction function a normalisation procedure isomorphic to the one presented in
^^Both growing capital/labor ration and constant factor shares are well documented stylised 
facts of the US post WWII data.
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Section 2. Leon-Ledesma, et al. (2010a) stress the empirical benefits of estimat­
ing and identifying normalised production functions, i.e. it simplifies the setting 
of initial conditions, it provides a neat link between theoretical and empirical 
production functions and allows ex-post validation of estimated parameters. 
Klump, et al. (2007), using a normalised CES function with factor-augmenting 
technical progress, estimate a three-equation, supply-side system and find elas­
ticity values for the US economy between 0.5 and 0.7. In a similar fashion, Leon- 
Ledesma, et al (20106, 2011) and McAdam and William (20136) find values of a 
in the same range.
Given the high variability of the estimated values of cr, in order to present 
our results in a robust manner I adopt as parametrisation for the US the interval 
(0.5,0.9), adopting as a central value a = 0.7. This parametrisation encompasses 
most of the recent empirical evidence.
The number of empirical studies on the elasticity of substitution for the UK 
and the EU is not as large as the for the US. Therefore the parametrisation 
for these two areas relies on a handful of papers. For the UK, Bolt and van 
Els (2000), by using a time series two steps estimation technique, find a value 
of a around 0.6. Barnes, et al. (2008) estimate the elasticity of substitution 
with a panel of UK firms and find an elasticity of substitution between 0.4 and 
0.65. As for the Euro Area, Klump, et al. (2007, 2012) estimate a normalised
refer the reader to section 2 for a discussion of the theoretical importance of normali­
sation.
4. A ggregate Stability and B alanced-Budget R ules 167
CES production function and find values between 0.6 and 0.7. Bolt and van 
Els (2000) find a lot of heterogeneity among European countries with values 
of cr that range from 0.24 (Austria) to 0.78 (Belgium). McAdam and William 
(2013a) report values of cr in the interval (0.65,0.8). I therefore conclude that 
a reasonable range for the UK and the EU for cr to be (0.4,0.8) with a central 
value of 0.6.
Balanced-budget rules and determ inacy analysis in th e U S, 
E U  and U K .
This section discusses the policy implications of evaluating a BBR when factors 
are gross complements. With the exception of a and the tax rates, our results are 
based on the same parametrisation used for Figures 1 and 2 so that the model is, 
ceteris paribus, in line with the analysis of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997). For 
the tax rates I use the estimation procedure of Mendoza, et al. (1994) for the 
US, the EU and the UK. Furthermore I parametrise a according to the typical 
ranges as described above.
I perform two exercises. In the first one, I study the stability properties of 
the model for the US, the EU and the UK by using the estimated labour and 
capital tax rates for 2007. In the second exercise I extend this analysis to the 
period 1995 — 2007. The estimated labour and capital tax rates for 2007 are 
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1 - 2007 Estimated Tax Rates
Capital Tax Labour Tax
US 0.382 0.284
EU 0.383 0.343
UK 0.451 0.304
The results of the first exercise are presented in Figure 3. This figure presents 
three subplots, each for different values of the elasticity of substitution. The three 
parametrisations of a represent the central value as well as the two extremes of 
the typical range of estimates as presented in the previous section. As discussed 
above, I assume that both labour and capital taxes are endogeneous and vary in 
the same proportion along the business cycle.
United S ta te s  
Lower Bound c=0 .5
United S ta te s  
Middle Value c = 0  7
E uropean Union 
Lower Bound o=0.4
0 2 0-4 0.5 0 8
United Kingdom 
Low er B oundc= 0 .4
0.2 0 4 0.6
E uropean  Union 
Middle Value a =0 .6
0 2 0.4 0 6
United Kingdom
Middle Value o=0
United S ta te s  
U pper Bound a=O.S
E uropean  Union 
U pper Bound e= 0 .8
United Kingdom 
U pper Bound c = 0
Figure 3 - Endogenous capital and labour income rate for the empirical range of a  
for the U.S. (first row), the E.U. (second row) and the U.K. (third row).
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The graph highlights three findings. First, the model parametrised at the 
central values of cr, i.e. 0.7 for the US and 0.6 for EU and UK, delivers determi­
nacy. This is the central result of this exercise and sheds light on the importance 
of evaluating BBR when factors are gross complements. Second, despite a sen­
sible reduction in the indeterminacy area, the model can still be indeterminate 
when I consider the high range of estimates of a, i.e. 0.9 for the US and 0.8 for 
both the EU and the UK. Third, the model evaluated in the CD case, i.e. in 
the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) analysis, is indeterminate in the US, the 
EU and the UK. In other words, given the 2007 tax rates, determinacy requires 
certain levels of complementarity between production factors, i.e. cr < 1. Fur­
thermore, it is interesting to note the destabilising properties of labour taxation: 
ceteris paribus, the higher the tax rates on labour the higher the likelihood of 
indeterminacy. The threshold values of cr necessary to obtain determinacy are 
reported in Table 2.
Table 2 - Threshold value of cr necessary for determinacy in 2007
US Determinate if cr < 0.82
EU Determinate if cr < 0.64
UK Determinate if cr < 0.72
In the second exercise, I repeat the analysis conducted for 2007 for each year
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of the period 1995 — 2007. Table 3 reports the lowest and highest values of the 
upper bound of o necessary to obtain determinacy. Changes in the threshold 
values of cr are due to changes in the labour and capital tax rates. A few things 
are worth stressing.
First, the upper bound of cr necessary to obtain determinacy is always lower 
than one. This implies that the results of Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997), i.e. a 
BBR coupled with a CD production function is likely to generate indeterminacy, 
hold for the period under consideration. Second, the model evaluated at the 
central values of the estimates of a  delivers determinacy in the whole period 
and for all the countries considered. Lastly, it is interesting to note that there 
may be the possibility that a BBR delivers determinacy for the entire range of 
realistic estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the US and UK (last column 
of Table 3).
Table 3 - Threshold values of cr for stability in the period 1995 — 2007
Lowest Value Highest Value
US Determinate if cr < 0.78 Determinate if cr < 0.93
EU Determinate if cr < 0.62 Determinate if cr < 0.68
UK Determinate if cr < 0.72 Determinate if a  < 0.92
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4.3 Conclusions
This chapter studies how the introduction of a general class of production func­
tion, namely a CES, which is able to match the empirical evidence on the substi­
tutability between labour and capital, changes the local determinacy analysis of 
a neoclassical economy where fiscal policy follows a balanced-budget rule (BBR), 
I obtain two sets of results. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, I show 
analytically that the degree of substitutability between production factors is a 
key ingredient in understanding the (de)stabilising properties of a BBR. In this 
respect I contribute to the theoretical literature of both the BBR and the CES 
production function (see among others Cuo and Harrison 2004, 2008, Ciannarit- 
sarou, 2007, Liimemann, 2008, Cuo and Lansing, 2009). Secondly, from a policy 
point of view, when I calibrate the model consistently with the empirical evi­
dence, i.e. elasticity of substitution below unity, the instability problems that 
affect the Schmitt-Crohè and Uribe model are sensibly reduced for the US, the 
EU and the UK. In this respect, our results contribute to the current policy 
debate and open the door to the plausibility of adopting a BBR.
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A ppendix A - The Norm alisation Procedure
As stated before, I am using a normalised CES production function. The mean­
ing of the normalisation is that the class of CES production functions needs a 
common benchmark point. Since the elasticity of substitution is defined as a 
point of elasticity, I need to fix the benchmark values for the level of production, 
factor inputs and for the marginal rate of substitution or equivalently for the 
per-capita production, capital deepening and factor income share.
Therefore, I need to recalibrate the parameters B  and a each time that the 
elasticity of substitution a is varied in order to have the factor shares and the 
steady state allocations constant. In particular, when a is varied, I want to 
maintain the value of B  equal to its CD counterpart. Furthermore, the value of 
a  is set such that the steady state capital income share equal to 0.7.
For our analysis I use as reference point the normalised quantities for the CD 
case, i.e. a = 1 and B = 1.
In order to achieve this I follow Cuo and Lansing (2009) where the parameters 
take the following expressions:
y C D
^  = 7-------- :----------------- i w  (4-19)
a  ( R O o f  +  (1  -  a )  ( f fC D ) î"
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where and are the steady state values of capital and labour of a CD 
production function. Eq. (4.18) can be easily derived following Klump and de 
La Crandville (2000) and Klump and Saam (2008). They show that the value 
n of a generic CES production function can be normalized in the following way:
where Ko, Hq represents the values at the chosen normalization point and ckq is 
defined as:
where represents the calibrated value of the capital share at the normalization 
point. Civen that I normalize the quantities for the CD case, I have that ai = 
â, Ko = and Hq = This implies that ao = â. From this, it is
straightforward to recover the values of the normalized parameter a.
A ppendix B - The Log-Linearised System
In order to study the local determinacy, I log-linearise the structural equations 
around the non-stochastic steady state. Here I present the log-linearised system. 
A lower case variable identifies Ct = log (§■). identifies the log-linearised 
labour tax rate. Wt is the log-linearisation real wage and ji^  the log-linearised 
real interest rate.
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—r h
Ct — (4.22)
0 — Wt ht (4.23)
y  c
kt =  -j^yt — hkt 4— — Ct (4.24)
Ct =  ypLt (4.25)
ht ~  ^  iVt kt) (4.26)
'^t = ~ {Vt — ht) (4.27)
Vt — 01 ^ 4- (1 — a) ^ ht (4.28)
where -0 =  If I substitute (4.18) and (4.19) into the previous expression I 
obtain:
yt = âkt 4- (1 -  a)ht
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A ppendix C - Determ inacy Analysis
The model can be reduced to one involving only two dynamic variables, namely, 
consumption (non-predetermined) and capital (predetermined), as:
Ct Ct
= J
kt kt
(4.29)
where:
J  =
a +T ^—a r ^ —l
I rv—rr'T^
The system is determinate if and only if:
Det ( J) < 0
While the system displays indeterminacy if and only if:
Det (J) > 0 n  Trace (J) < 0 (4.30)
i.e. both eigenvalues of J  are negative, and it is unstable if and only if:
Det (J) > 0 n Trace {J) > 0
i.e. both eigenvalues of J  are positive.
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P roof o f Propositions 1 and 2
Determinant and trace of J  are respectively:
(d - «) - 2 (l - 5^ )  r-* + (l - 5^ ) )
Trace (J) = iP + 5) {l -  ar'^) -  {p + 8) {{l -  r>^ ) (1 -  â)) _  ^
a  —  <7T"
Sign o f th e D eterm inant
The sign of the determinant is the product of the sign of and (1 — a) (t^)'
2 (i -  ’■'* + (l -  “4?) ■
Part 1: Sign of
S + p (err — a ) cr
Part2: Sign of (1 -  a) -  2 ( l  -  +  ( l  -  :
See Steady State section in the main text, i.e:
(1 — ü) (r^)^—2 ^1 — ^  r^+^1  — > 0 if and only if r^ G [0,r^*)
Furthermore note that if r^ =  0.5, (1 — ü) (r^)^—2 r^+^1 — >
0. Putting Part 1 and part 2 together one obtains that the determinant is posi­
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tive:
i / r ' * *  >  -  e
O’ o
else T G , 1))o cr
Sign o f th e Trace
The trace of J  is:
Trace ( J) =  (P +  ^) (l ~  -  ( ,  +  ^) ((l -  r^) ( 1 - 5 ) )  _  ^
a  — O T^
It is easy to show that the conditions for Trace ( J) < 0 are:
i f a  < +
P O’
elseif cr > 1 +  — — — ^  -  < \ =p cr per — (1 — a;) (d +  p)
elseif cr < Ô —> Trace ( J) > 0 V G [0,1]
R esult 1: D eterm inacy
The system as defined in (4.29) is determinate if and only if Det (J) < 0, hence:
i f  O’ G [ü, +oo) = >  G [0, min ( “ j ) U G (max , 1]
else o G [0, ü )  G [0, r^*)
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R esult 2: Indeterm inacy-Instability
Define e = • The following four cases fully categorise all the model
outcomes:
a) I f  (7 e and — < the model is indeterminate if E ( — ) 
cr Vcr /
and determinate if ^ .
b) I f  a e
P
and — > the model is unstable if E ^r^*,min 
and determinate if ^ min .
c) I f  a E ^1 H ^ ,+ o o ^  and e > r^*, the model is indeterminate if E ( “ 5'^^*)
and determinate if ^ •
d) I f  a E 4—  ---- —, + 0 0 ^ and e < the model is indeterminate if E ( “ 3^)
and unstable if E (s, T^*) and determinate if ^ .
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis examined various aspects of DSGE modeling and its empirical and 
policy applications.
The first chapter addressed several important issues that are being studied 
in the macro-financial literature. In particular, it deals with the importance of 
financial frictions along the business cycle. This chapter sets out a closed econ­
omy New Keynesian DSGE model with two distinct sets of financial frictions. 
The first affects the relationship between banks and depositors where the level 
of deposits is endogenously determined and depends on the net worth of the fi­
nancial institution. This is modeled along the lines of Gertler and Karadi (2011) 
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011). The second one affects the firm-bank relation­
ship. In this case the amount of bank lending is determined endogenously and 
depends on the net worth of the entrepreneur. On the modeling side, the novel 
feature is how this last friction is modeled. The literature assumed asymmetric
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information introduced by Townsed (1979) and formalized in a DSGE frame­
work by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In my framework I assume 
perfect information, in the sense that the bank can full information about the 
creditworthiness of the borrower through complete information of the balance 
sheet.
I compared the empirical properties of this model with two models: a model 
with a single financial friction on, the banking side and a plain vanilla New 
Keynesian model. On this side the novelty resides in the fact that I compared 
the models in environments with financial and non financial data. In both cases, 
the result provided strong evidence when an additional friction is included in the 
model. Moreover, variance decomposition highlighted that the capital quality 
shock dominates the investment shock. This is an important result since it 
highlights the fact that financial shocks are the key driver of the economy.
However, this framework does not consider a third friction that could have 
interesting business cycle implication: the collateral constraint in the household 
sector. As highlighted by lacoviello (2005) a collateral constraint tied to hous­
ing values has strong empirical and policy implication. An interesting extension 
of this exercise would be to include this extra friction. This comparison be­
tween three would complete the analysis of Brzoza-Brzezina & Kolasa (2012) 
and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013). In this series of papers, the authors analyse 
the empirical properties of models with different financial frictions. However
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they make a “horizontal” comparison between models in the sense that they 
compare models with a single financial friction only. My approach would be to 
make a “vertical” comparison in the sense that I would examine the empirical 
properties of models that have a set of additional financial frictions.
The second chapter examined how macroprudential policy can mitigate the 
effects of shocks and in particular of shocks that have a financial origin. To 
this extend I developed an open economy New Keynesian model with banking 
frictions modeled after Gertler and Karadi (2011). The key novelty is how the 
macroprudential policy is modeled. I assumed that banks are charged with a 
penalty when they deviate from a given value of the leverage ratio. Furthermore 
this given leverage ratio changes with the economic conditions as in the proposed 
Basel III regulation. The results highlighted the effectiveness of macropruden­
tial policies in mitigating the effects of the shocks and in particular of financial 
shock. Moreover, I showed that, in terms of welfare loss, an economy with 
macroprudential regulation and a Taylor rule that responds to credit growth is 
preferred.Currently, together with the Asia-Pacific division of the International 
Monetary Fund, I am working in extending this framework to include more fi­
nancial frictions that open the door for the study of the interactions of different 
macroprudential policy instruments. Moreover, we will compute the optimal pol­
icy with estimated values of the shocks in order to have an empirical foundation 
for the analysis of different Taylor rules. In addition to that, the analysis will
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consider different exchange rate regimes to create a toolkit that can be applied 
to a broad range of countries.
Finally, the last chapter studied how the indeterminacy problem studied 
by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) can be solved. By generalizing the Cobb- 
Douglas production function to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution production 
function I showed that the indeterminacy region reduces drastically. Further­
more I showed that the likelihood for the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Europe to be in the indeterminate area is sensibly reduced.
At the moment I am working on an interesting and promising extension of 
this framework that will be soon published in the International Monetary Fund 
working paper series. This project aims to study the indeterminacy problem 
caused by interest rate policy using the framework of Benhabib and Eusepi 
(2005). Following my chapter the framework considers balanced-budget rules 
and it also allows for public debt as in Linnemann (2006), Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2007) and Kurozumi (2010).
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